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Constitutionality of Torture in a
Ticking-Bomb Scenario: History,
Compelling Governmental
Interests, and Supreme Court
Precedents
Riddhi Dasgupta*
Introduction
Adopted in 1791, the Eighth Amendment provides:
―Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.‖1 Is
torture a cruel and unusual punishment? How about torture in
a ticking-bomb scenario where the pain of one man or woman
might mean saving the life of many others?
The
constitutionality of torture is a complex question. It cannot be
resolved with platitudes. Indeed, the platitudes that do exist in
the form of legal prescription are often conflicting. Consider,
for instance, the obvious conflict caused when these two
commands, read in isolation, are taken to their logical
extremes: self-preservation by any means and ensuring the
human rights and dignity of all, irrespective of exigencies.
Deciding whether the use of torture to ascertain secretive and
potentially time-sensitive, disaster-avoiding information from
an interrogated in a ticking-bomb scenario is constitutionally
justified poses such a tension. Whether torture is actually
revelatory is a question of substantial debate.

* Doctoral student, University of Cambridge. The author is a former
research assistant to Neal K. Katyal, counsel to the petitioner in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), and in Engquist v. Oregon Department of
Agriculture, 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008), and now Principal Deputy Solicitor
General at the United States Department of Justice. He expresses his
gratitude to Nandita Dasgupta, Utpal Dasgupta, Mark Stadnyk, Tom Grant,
and the articles editors of the PACE LAW REVIEW for their support. Mr.
Dasgupta can be reached at rd2136@columbia.edu.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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American federal law enactments as well as international
human rights conventions have outlawed the use of torture
(even though procedural loopholes remain alive).2 Prevailing
military expert consensus attributes inefficacy to the use of
torture. Revered American political literature harkening back
to the Enlightenment tradition, represented by Jean Jacques
Rousseau,3 John Adams,4 and the Preamble to the American
Constitution5 all disavow retribution, both public and private,
2. See, e.g., Eric Engle, The Alien Tort Statute and The Torture Victims'
Protection Act: Jurisdictional Foundations and Procedural Obstacles, 14
WILLAMETTE J. INT‘L L. & DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (2006) (―Though the United States
is perceived as a chronic ‗non-joiner‘ of international human rights treaties,
several U.S. laws permit individual citizens and aliens to prosecute overseas
human rights violations in U.S. courts. Examples include the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS), the Torture Victims' Protection Act (TVPA), the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act (RICO), the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act (or 'Helms-Burton Act').
Procedurally, however, the
viability of such claims is tempered by the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act
(FSIA) and the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
both of which limit the availability of substantive remedies when the
defendant is a state actor.‖ (internal footnotes omitted)). Altogether, the
federal law provisions outlawing many forms of coercive interrogation are 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340(1), 2340A, 3261–3267 (2000); 10 U.S.C. §§ 893, 918, 919, 924,
928, 933.
3. See, e.g, JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, OR
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT (1762) (―The passage from the state of nature
to the civil state produces in man a very remarkable change, by substituting
in his conduct justice for instinct, and by giving his actions the moral quality
that they previously lacked. It is only when the voice of duty succeeds
physical impulse, and law succeeds appetite, that man, who till then had
regarded only himself, sees that he is obliged to act on other principles, and
to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations.‖).
4. See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS, ON PRIVATE REVENGE (1763) (―For the great
distinction between savage nations and polite ones, lies in this, — that among
the former every individual is his own judge and his own executioner; but
among the latter all pretensions to judgment and punishment are resigned to
tribunals erected by the public; a resignation which savages are not, without
infinite difficulty, persuaded to make, as it is of a right and privilege
extremely dear and tender to an uncultivated nature.‖). Adams‘s analysis
impliedly draws a contrast between the famed classical virtues, ―Justice,
Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance,‖ and the less desirable vices of certain
officialdoms, ―savage state, courage, hardiness, activity, and strength.‖
5. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (―We the People of the United States, in Order to
form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America.‖). The Preamble denotes
the aims of the Republic, and signals, as eloquently and meaningfully as any

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/19

2

546

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

as a reason underlying official conduct, and instead, counsel a
deliberative approach. That constitutional deliberation did not
occur in the now-famous ―Bybee memo‖—an advisory opinion
issued by Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee in the
Office of Legal Counsel in President George W. Bush‘s
administration.6 While the Bybee memo carefully discusses the
statutory and treaty implications of torture, its constitutional
analysis has little to do with individual liberties, specifically
regarding the Eighth Amendment.7 Instead, the discussion
centers almost completely on the President‘s commander-inchief powers authorized by Article II of the Constitution. In
fact, the Bybee memo makes a passing reference to the ―rather
limitless reach‖ of the Eighth Amendment‘s ban against cruel
and unusual punishment: it states that court decisions have
―engage[d] in detailed regulation of prison conditions.‖8 More
conversation is needed on the subject.9
These prescriptions ask, rather than answer, several
questions. Are water-boarding and other forms of torture
constitutional when imposed by a sovereign State (specifically
the National Security Agency (NSA) or the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA)) confronted with imminent threats against its
national security interest? Is there a constitutional distinction
with respect to interrogated citizens versus non-citizens,
particularly with regard to extraordinary rendition?10 Has the
document can, the coexistence and actuation of these ideals.
6. Letter from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Attorney General (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo200208
01.pdf.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 18 n.9.
9. Other scholars and academics have been harsher in their treatment of
the Bybee memo. See, e.g., M. Katherine B. Darmer, Waterboarding and the
Legacy of the Bybee-Yoo “Torture-Power” Memorandum: Reflections from a
Temporary Yoo Colleague and Erstwhile Bush Administration Apologist, 12
CHAP. L. REV. 639 (2009); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in
the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1231 & n.182 (2006) (―In the
two years since it was leaked to the public, the . . . [memo] has been withered
by criticism for the poor quality of its legal analysis.‖ (referencing statement
by former Yale Law School Dean Harold H. Koh, claiming it was ―perhaps the
most clearly erroneous legal opinion I have ever read‖)); Jeremy Waldron,
Torture and Positive Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1703-09 (2005) (quality
of memo ―is a disgrace‖).
10. See Owen Fiss, Restoring the Full Rule of Law to America: Indemnify
Torture Victims — A Commentary, THE DAILY STAR, July 7, 2009, http://

3

2010]

TICKING-BOMB SCENARIO

547

United States Supreme Court applied the strict scrutiny test to
analogous situations, such as the cases of tortured or abused
prisoners in the United States‘ federal and state prisons? How
can we best analyze the compelling governmental interests in
support of torture in ticking-bomb scenarios? What are the farreaching national security implications of these questions?
And finally, what relevance do the experiences of terrorismfraught nations such as Israel have for American constitutional
adjudication? This Article cannot answer all these questions in
sufficient depth, but, through the use of history, it does answer
the fundamental ones.11
Part I explains why the Supreme Court‘s decisions support
the argument that torture is in most situations forbidden by
the Eighth Amendment. The prevailing constructions can be
found in the Court‘s Hudson v. McMillian,12 Brown v.
Mississippi,13 and Miranda v. Arizona14 lines of decisions.
There is a bifurcation between preventive detention torture
and punishment torture, and the merits and disadvantages of
both are explained here. Many objective deductions and some
subjective value-judgments inform the inquiry.
In Part II, this Article explores the constitutionality of
torture in time-sensitive, ―clear and present danger‖15 scenarios
www.law.yale.edu/news/9844.htm (defining extraordinary rendition as ―the
transportation of individuals suspected of terrorist activity to foreign
countries for interrogation, sometimes torture‖ (referencing Arar v. Ashcroft,
532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008))); Matteo M. Winkler, When „Extraordinary‟
Means Illegal: International Law and the European Reactions to the United
States Rendition Program (Yale Law School Student Scholarship Series,
2007), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/46/.
11. This exercise is intended to highlight the advantages and limitations
of history as much as it is to answer the questions themselves.
12. 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (holding that excessive force against a prisoner
may constitute a cruel and unusual punishment).
13. 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding that confessions exacted by torture and
police violence violate due process and may not be admitted into trial as
evidence).
14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that defendant must be informed of her
right to an attorney and her privilege against self-incrimination both before
and during questioning by police; otherwise, inculpatory and exculpatory
statements gained from such questioning is inadmissible).
15. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (―The question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war, many things that
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by using the following historical instruments: the English Bill
of Rights, the Virginia and Massachusetts convention debates,
and the somewhat enlightening exchanges between delegates
at the First Congress, which adopted the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment was inspired by the English Bill of
Rights, the Northwest Ordinance, Virginia‘s Constitution of
1776, and the Constitutions of seven other States. These 17th
and 18th century documents, read collectively, express a
limited view on imminent danger situations. However, their
condemnation against torture per se is beyond dispute. I reject
as unprecedented and injudicious the possibility of
―retrenching‖ the pro-individual interpretation of the Founding
era.
Part III explores the prospect of torture warrants, as
explained articulately by Professor Alan Dershowitz.16 Despite
federal law having outlawed torture by government officials,
the debate is not academic or moot. The ―rhetorical‖ ban on
torture frequently is violated with impunity, thus incentivizing
the legal community to devise a better framework that respects
societal interests and human dignity—transparently. Torture
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their
utterance will not be endured . . . .‖). May other exigencies, apart from
restricted speech, also be justified under the threat of a ―clear and present
danger‖? The conflict between national security and civil liberties was
brought to a great height during World War I and the espionage cases, such
as Schenck and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), but that
conflict has an ancient pedigree that goes all the way back to the Founding
generation. See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, at xxvii
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 1973) (―[P]erhaps it is a universal truth that the
loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or
pretended, from abroad.‖ (quoting James Madison)). The debate, then and
now, continues. See generally Norman Dorsen, Rights — Here and There:
Foreign Affairs and Civil Liberties, 83 AM. J. INT‘L L. 840 (1989); George P.
Fletcher, War and the Constitution, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2002, available at
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=war_and_the_constitution
(attending to ―the fundamental question of whether the Constitution . . . is
different in wartime versus peacetime‖ and observing that ―[t]he fact of
‗wartime‘ does not change the meaning or scope of due process — either
linguistically or historically‖); Brief of Petitioner at 71, New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (No. 1873), 1971 WL 147018 (noting
that the United States' ―experience with censorship of political speech is
happily almost non-existent. Through wars and other turbulence, we have
avoided it. Given the choice of risks, we have chosen to risk freedom, as the
First Amendment enjoins us to do‖).
16. See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS:
UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE (2002).
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warrants, the argument goes, reduce the incidents of torture by
dwindling both the number and severity of incidents to their
absolute minimums. The test for whether a torture warrant
should be authorized must be based on criteria grounded in the
Supreme Court‘s qualified immunity jurisprudence, stemming
from its decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics17. Although Bivens has been
eroded through procedural vehicles, such as pleading
standards, I argue that provided those errors are rectified, the
Bivens standard, viewed in light of qualified immunity,
provides a valuable test for courts to employ when evaluating
the constitutionality of torture warrants. Because half a loaf is
better than no loaf at all, precluding torture in some grossly
unwarranted cases through torture warrants should be seen as
superior to blameless torture victims being deprived of the
chance to recover all relief after the fact. The issue of torture‘s
constitutionality may well turn on evolving statutory and
common law procedures rather than substantive constitutional
law animating the Framers and the Republic‘s Enlightenment
origins. In many ways, this entire Article and the mapping of
torture‘s possibilities and constitutionality in the United States
is really a tale of procedure. That is the carrefour where most
real-life cases are decided.
Part IV identifies the need to engage in further debate.
This Article is agnostic about whether torture, under specific
situations, should be permissible as a matter of policy or even
whether it comports with the Constitution.
It presents
arguments and uncertainties from both sides of the spectrum.
I.

Precedents for Torture as Punishment and as Preventive
Interrogation

A. The Humanity Question
Torture in a ticking-bomb scenario is deontologically
challenging. Not only are there legitimate ethical and logical
questions for circumstances where torture is imposed, there
remain important constitutional and philosophical questions
where the government actually forgoes torture. Even when the
17. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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government chooses not to commit torture in an extremely
time-sensitive situation, it will be hard to know (with any
reasonable certitude) the actual factors that stopped the attack
in that instance. The ticking-bomb scenario is context-specific,
given the probabilities of an attack and of the torturee18
possessing the requisite information to stop the attack. The
tipping point between seemingly incompatible ―values and
principles is not fixed. It differs from case to case and from
issue to issue. The damage to national security caused by a
given terrorist and the [N]ation‘s response to the act affects the
way in which the freedom and dignity of the individual is
protected.‖19 In such times of panic, it is important to keep in
mind that it ―is not that law is suspended in times of
emergency . . . The point rather is that law is flexible enough to
allow judges to give controlling weight to the immediate
consequences of decision if those consequences are sufficiently
grave.‖20 Because of this vast room for judicial discretion,
though, principles and consistency are ever more important so
as to preclude judges from indulging their personal policy
preferences at the cost of neutrality.21
Other issues informing the investigation are the amount of
torture imposed (and the methods which are categorically
impermissible), whether innocent lives can be saved without
performing torture, and the use of torture in non-terrorist

18. At times, this Article will use the term ―torturee‖ to refer to
prospective torturees and those who have already been tortured and are
seeking post-torture relief through federal constitutional and statutory
means.
19. OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS:
EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 73 (2006) (quoting Aharon
Barak, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy, and the Fight Against
Terrorism, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 125, 135 (2003)).
20. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 294 (2003).
21. There remains much scholarly disputation regarding the ability of
courts to serve as a forum where national security cases are litigated. The
consensus seems to be that courts may not monopolize the discourse but must
add a strong voice to ensure a balance between individual liberties and
government interests.
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 722-30 (3d ed. 2000); Larry Alexander & Frederick
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV.
1359, 1375 (1997); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); Keith E.
Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objects and
Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2002).
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situations (counseled to be restricted or forbidden). The debate
is clearly not ―hypothetical, or . . .
morally or legally
irrelevant.‖22 Not only do too many assumptions go into a
decision to use torture as a preventive interrogation technique,
but the empirical odds of a detainee possessing valuable
information—less than 0.1%—is notoriously discouraging.23 A
cold cost-benefit analysis inspired by utilitarianism also does
At any rate, the
not unambiguously support torture.24
perpetual slippery-slope here is that unless we know that some
forms of torture in some emergencies are unconstitutional,
government torturers will always try to classify an emergency
as a ―ticking-bomb scenario,‖ and may reach a point of
dangerous insouciance in that fashion. This approach cloaks
officials with immediate immunity and precludes the plaintiff
from ever recovering relief.
Puzzlingly, the possibilities could range from ―This torture
did work!‖ to ―The attackers are aiming for a bigger target
later.‖ Even more importantly, usually it will not be known
whether future scenarios similarly require (or do not require)
torture. Conversely, when the government does torture and
the information gained from the interrogated is used and the
22. See, e.g., Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic
Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1487 (2004).
23. See Jeannine Bell, “Behind This Mortal Bone”: The (In)Effectiveness
of Torture, 83 IND. L.J. 339, 352 (2008) (―More than 5000 foreign nationals
were detained between September 11, 2001, and the time the photos at Abu
Ghraib were publicized. Four years after the detention, only three were
charged, and two of those were acquitted. Such a low hit rate, three charges
out of more than 5000 detainees, certainly suggested that the Allied Forces
were just guessing whether the detainees possessed intelligence with the
lifesaving potential . . . . A hit rate of 0.06% seems awfully low to justify a
practice that has the moral and ethical problems of torture ‗lite.‘‖). See also
Elaine Scarry, Five Errors in the Reasoning of Alan Dershowitz, in TORTURE:
A COLLECTION 281-90 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (pointing out that it is
speculative whether the subject of prospective coercive interrogation even
possesses the requisite information, let alone whether this interrogation will
yield that information; it is another fine line to interrogate in a manner that
is coercive enough to be preventive but not so much as to become punitive, for
the latter is a punishment that can only be imposed post-trial).
24. See, e.g., Jean Maria Arrigo, A Utilitarian Argument Against Torture
Interrogation of Terrorists, 10 SCI. & ENG‘G ETHICS 543 (2004); JOHN CONROY,
UNSPEAKABLE ACTS, ORDINARY PEOPLE: THE DYNAMICS OF TORTURE 112 (2000);
Joseph Lelyveld, Interrogating Ourselves, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, § 6
(Magazine), available at 2005 WLNR 9302778; Saul M. Kassin, On the
Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 215 (2005).
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attack is stopped, there is no strict causal evidence suggesting
that but for the torture, the attack would have been executed.
Reduced to its essentials, the moral philosopher Judith Jarvis
Thomson‘s ―trolley problem‖ would permit this manner of
torture: torture of one person takes no life and might save
many other lives.25 To end the inquiry here, however, would
ignore Anglo-American historical and constitutional traditions
that respect bodily integrity and truth-seeking in criminal
procedure.
Human dignity cannot be separated from the torture
inquiry; it is the linchpin connecting the Fifth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the constitutional issues raised
here. The uniform relevance of these constitutional provisions
transcending time and space bespeaks the vision and intent of
their Drafters. The question is governed, if not haunted, by
Abraham Lincoln‘s now-famous assertion that ―As I would not
be a slave, so I would not be a master.‖26 This statement is
best characterized as a measure of empathy in the most
measured sense. It is a reflection of its author‘s ability to
understand the process at issue, while simultaneously
engaging in self-check and self-regulation such that no
unexamined biases and sympathies undermine a neutral,
dispassionate and objective inquiry.
Whether as a
discrimination victim or as a torture victim, understanding
how the process works from all sides of the equation—the
powerful and the powerless—enriches the law. On the torture
issue, the statement says more about the torturer, for at the
time of the torture not much is usually known about the
turpitude of or knowledge possessed by the torturee.
Some might say that imposing torture on the
presupposition of a ticking bomb would be prudent and rational
under many tests. But a government‘s imposition of that
treatment does not detract from the fact that torture is morally
troublesome (intrinsically) and creates an adverse and
insidious precedent (purposively)—especially if conducted
without safeguards. Jean Améry characterizes the act itself,
25. See generally Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE
L.J. 1395 (1985).
26. LINCOLN ON DEMOCRACY 121 (Mario M. Cuomo et al. eds., 2004)
(quoting Abraham Lincoln: ―This expresses my idea of democracy. Whatever
differs from this, to the extent of the difference, is no democracy‖).
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irrespective of details (including how many instances it has
been imposed), as ―border violation of [self] by the other, which
can be neither neutralized by the expectation of help nor
rectified through resistance.‖27 Michel Foucault, somewhat
bemusedly, attributes the disappearance of torture from the
public sphere to society‘s ―humanization.‖28 Torture did not
disappear altogether, however, and the irony of the Foucault
inference (of which Foucault doubtless was aware) is that the
hand of a torturer might even be strengthened by diminished
visibility.
Talal Asad acknowledges that the ―modern
dedication‖ to ridding the domain of what is lawful of torture
―often conflicts with other commitments and values: the right
of individuals to choose and the duty of the state to maintain
its interests.‖29 This duality between the rights of the torturee
and the rights of the innocent is where the Article becomes
interesting.
This is also where the need for nuance grows even
stronger. Details are terribly important, and there are many
sides and counterpunches to the humanity argument.30 Alan
Dershowitz concedes that allowing any torture is a symbolic
step back for human rights.31 Adam Raviv responds, so what?
According to Raviv, ―to argue that people‘s moral compasses
will truly be damaged if torture is prohibited 99.9% of the time
rather than 100%‖ is fanciful.32 In advancing his reluctant case
27. JEAN AMÉRY, AT THE MIND‘S LIMITS: CONTEMPLATIONS BY A SURVIVOR
AUSCHWITZ AND ITS REALITIES 33 (Sidney Rosenfeld & Stella P. Rosenfeld
trans., 1980) (1966) (―[O]nly in torture does the transformation of the person
into flesh become complete. Frail in the face of violence, yelling out in pain,
awaiting no help, capable of no resistance, the tortured person is only a body,
and nothing else beside that.‖). See also id. at 39 (the torturer becomes the
―absolute sovereign,‖ now empowered ―to inflict suffering and destroy‖).
28. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH
OF THE PRISON (1975).
29. Talal Asad, On Torture, or Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading
Treatment, in SOCIAL SUFFERING 285 (Arthur Kleinman et al. eds., 1997).
30. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of
Civil Liberties in Time of Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 11 (1988).
See also id. at 19 (―[A]bstract principles announcing the applicability of civil
liberties during times of war and crisis are ineffectual when a war or other
crisis comes along unless the principles are fleshed out by a detailed
jurisprudence explaining how those civil liberties will be sustained against
particularized national security concerns.‖).
31. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 16, at 145.
32. Adam Raviv, Torture and Justification: Defending the Indefensible,
ON
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for torture warrants, Dershowitz himself concluded that ―there
are numerous instances in which torture has produced selfproving, truthful information that was necessary to prevent
harm to civilians.‖33 Moreover, Raviv argues, ―[j]ust because
certain human rights norms are not absolute priorities of the
state does not mean that the state has entirely lost respect for
them.‖34 Balancing security with liberty is an experiment that
has long bedeviled governments, and they are entitled to
attempt to perfect it. Richard Posner looks to world experience
and concludes: France, the United Kingdom, and Israel have
―used torture to extract information, yet none . . . has sunk into
barbarism.‖35 The occasional restrictive use of torture does not,
Posner suggests, lead to a complete meltdown in moral
values.36 The variety of perspectives here, all on the humanity
question, should elicit respect for nuance and complexity.
But Professor Scott Goldberg is wrong to liken this line of
argument with the observation that ―just as Americans have
not lost respect for the right to freedom and self-determination
in the face of a criminal justice system that takes that right
from individuals in certain circumstances, they will not lose
respect for the right to be free from torture if it is allowed in
certain circumstances.‖37
Americans retain esteem and
obedience for the rule of law because the rule of law does the
same for their essential human dignity and because those
punishments are proportionate to the crime, not abjectly
rejected by history, and imposed after a fair trial with ―the full
panoply of protections‖38—they are not imposed upon a hunch.
It is considerably tougher to make that case for interrogative,
13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135, 144 (2004) (discussing Emanuel Gross, Legal
Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance Between the Right of Democracy
to Defend Itself and the Protection of Human Rights, 6 UCLA J. INT‘L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 89, 101 (2001)).
33. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 16, at 137.
34. Raviv, supra note 32, at 145.
35. Richard A. Posner, Torture, Terrorism and Interrogation, in
TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 23, at 294.
36. Id.
37. Scott J. Goldberg, Torture: Considering a Framework for Limiting
Use 13 (bepress Legal Series, Working Paper No. 946, 2006), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4581&context=expresso.
38. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 419 (1993) (O‘Connor, J.,
concurring) (articulating that in the Anglo-American tradition trials are the
crucibles that determine the culpability of the accused).
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preventive, pre-trial torture.
B. Supreme Court Decisions: Due Process and Cruel and
Unusual Punishments
There is no support, in the text or history of the
Constitution, for the hypothesis that torture is not
―punishment‖ within the scope of the Eighth Amendment. The
contemporary legal dictionary definition of ―punishment‖ is ―[a]
penalty imposed on a defendant duly convicted of a crime by an
authorized court,‖39 and there is no evidence to suggest that
―punishment‖ meant something different when the Bill of
Rights was proposed or ratified. The error is exacerbated by
the important detail providing that the unwarranted
imposition of torture violates the Due Process Clause.40 How
can torture, quintessentially a deprivation of liberty (to put it
mildly), comport with the due process of law if imposed ex ante
a fair trial, which would require finding the existence of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt?41 In this analysis, I would use a
three-part test.
First, due process requires notice and the opportunity to be
heard before the government can deprive a person of her
liberty or continue such deprivation for a period of time. The
Supreme Court‘s decision in Wilkinson v. Austin instructs that
the ―liberty interest in avoiding particular conditions of
confinement . . . arise[s] from state policies or regulations.‖42
The Court in Wilkinson, adhering to its earlier decision in
Mathews v. Eldridge,43 required ―notice of the factual basis
39. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LAW 428 (6th ed. 2006) (emphasis added).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V (―No person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .‖). The Fifth Amendment
applies to the Federal Government‘s actions, whereas the Fourteenth
Amendment—―nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law‖—applies the protections to state
conduct. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. It is well-settled that ―reasonable doubt‖ is the proper criminal law
standard both in state court and in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313-24 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
368 (1970). See also JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF:
EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE ANCIEN REGIME 15 (1977).
42. 545 U.S. 209, 222 (2005).
43. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (establishing a framework for evaluating
procedural due process and determining what constitutes a liberty interest).
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leading to consideration‖ of harsh confinement ―and a fair
opportunity for rebuttal.‖44 The government must ―play by its
own rules,‖45 and must not deprive the torturee of a ―fair
warning.‖46 This constitutional analysis involved the duration
and conditions of punishment. The constitutional safeguards
were grounded both in law and in reliability: ―these are among
the most important procedural mechanisms for purposes of
avoiding erroneous deprivations.‖47 That is just the first step of
the inquiry.
Second, consistent with prevailing judicial precedents, the
appropriate punishment has to be determined. Determining
whether torture is ―warranted,‖ to be sure, implicates the hardto-discern ―sliding scale‖—theoretically, at least, more sound
than a strict tiered-approach. That accounts for the usual
proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment, which
is discussed later in this Article. But it also implicates the core
requirements of due process. The Eighth Amendment and due
process might not be strictly coextensive but they do overlap,
especially in cases where particularly harsh treatment of a
detainee (as punishment or as preventive interrogation) is
followed by a cursory or nonexistent fact-finding procedure.
Along with Mathews and Wilkinson, the Court‘s holding in
Sandin v. Conner provides that in order for a prisoner to
maintain a viable constitutional claim, he must face atypical
and significant hardship, which is harsher than normal prison
life.48 In the pre-trial context, we might transpose this rule to
conclude that the degree to which a hardship significantly
44. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 225-26.
45. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533 (2000) (reversing defendant‘s
conviction of sex crimes on the grounds that it violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the U.S. Constitution). In Carmell, a Texas law providing that the
victim‘s testimony alone was sufficient for conviction came into effect after
petitioner committed certain sex offenses. At the time the offenses were
committed, the law required that the victim‘s testimony be corroborated by
other evidence in order to support a conviction. The Court found that such
prosecution infringes on ―fundamental fairness‖ as it is only advantageous to
the State. See generally Carmell, 529 U.S. 513.
46. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981) (defining ―fair
warning‖ as an individual‘s ability to rely on the meaning of a law until it is
explicitly changed).
47. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 226.
48. 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (holding that respondent‘s placement in
segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant
deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest).
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outweighs the usual inconveniences and conditions of pre-trial
detention is an important factor in the due process inquiry.
Wilkinson reaffirmed Sandin, holding that ―a liberty
interest in avoiding particular conditions of confinement may
arise from state policies or regulations.‖49 The Ohio prison
procedure upheld by the Wilkinson Court was characterized as
―informal‖ and ―non-adversarial,‖ and therefore, considering
that neither label applies to a torture scenario, Wilkinson does
not reflexively immunize torture punishments from due process
challenges.50 Wilkinson maintained that ―the touchstone of the
inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty
interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not
the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the
nature of those conditions themselves ‗in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.‘‖51 Put another way: was the
conduct to which the torturee was subjected notably harsher
than what an ordinary prisoner would face? Or, were there
compelling, or at the bare minimum, rational reasons? Or
finally, was the treatment excessive? Sandin creates a difficult
standard for plaintiffs to satisfy, requiring evidence that the
time and duration of confinement exacted a significant and
atypical hardship constituting the deprivation of a liberty
interest protected by due process.52 But that more demanding
standard is not implicated in the cases of pre-trial detainees,
including torturees.
Moreover, some lower federal courts now hold that the
imposition of painful physical restraints during the movement
of pretrial detainees require ―reasonable after-the-fact
procedural protections to ensure that such restrictions on
liberty will be terminated reasonably soon if they have no
justification.‖53 Of course, in Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme
Court pieced together these different standards and rules.54
The Court then restated the test for deciding if a condition of
confinement (which may well include torture, in which case the
government‘s burden becomes nearly insurmountable) was
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 222.
See id. at 229.
Id. at 223 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).
See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 188 (2d Cir. 2001).
441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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unconstitutional under due process:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint, whether it has historically
been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment — retribution
and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it
applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned . . . .55
A third step, I demur, is also necessary in light of the historical
Eighth Amendment condemnation (even though this is a due
process inquiry) against torture. This step concerns something
more than a proportionality analysis; it asks why the
defendant must suffer a punishment that constitutional history
forbids. Why must the absolute limitation on torture as
punishment be infringed?
The sentencing court must
painstakingly analyze why, flying in the face of constitutional
history, the categorical constitutional prohibition on torture as
punishment might be breached. This line should not be
crossed. While ―adjudicating constitutional claims rooted in
the Magna Carta or other common law institutions, the
[Supreme] Court [previously has] noted [that] ‗[o]ne of the
consistent themes of the era was that Americans had all the
rights of English subjects.‘‖56 Constitutional courts in the
United States have no power to roll back or retrench a
constitutional right considered and protected (in that specific
sense) by the Framers. That would set a pernicious precedent
and remove a constraint which has worked rather well
throughout the Republic‘s past.
If humanity is the aim of due process and the Eighth
55. Id. at 537-38 (emphasis in original) (quoting Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
56. Riddhi Dasgupta, Boumediene v. Bush and Extraterritorial Habeas
Corpus in Wartime, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 425, 442 & n.125 (2009)
(quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983)).
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Amendment‘s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, then
ensuring the veracity and accuracy of confessions and
information is the goal of the Fifth Amendment‘s SelfIncrimination Clause. The self-incrimination privilege states:
―[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
That right, ―closely linked
witness against himself.‖57
historically with the abolition of torture,‖ is considered a
―landmark[ ] in man‘s struggle to make himself civilized.‖58
The Fifth Amendment‘s privilege against self-incrimination is
functionally equivalent to any constitutional proscription
against torture as a means of the suspect incriminating herself.
The privilege does not protect the suspect from being a witness
against another entity.59 Professor Erwin Griswold defined the
privilege as ―one of the fundamental decencies in the relation
we have developed between government and man.‖60 Moreover,
it is ―a rule of conduct generally to be followed by our Nation‘s
officialdom. It counsels officers of the United States (and of
any State of the United States) against extracting testimony
when the person examined reasonably fears that his words
would be used against him in a later criminal prosecution.‖61
There is no strong reason why ―the [Fifth] Amendment
ordinarily [w]ould [not] command the respect of United States
interrogators, whether the prosecution reasonably feared by
the examinee is domestic or foreign.‖62 Just as constitutional
57. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
58. ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE 5TH AMENDMENT TODAY 7-8 (1955) (The
Fifth Amendment articulates ―one of the fundamental decencies in the
relation we have developed between government and man.‖). See also Eben
Moglen, The Privilege in British North America: the Colonial Period to the
Fifth Amendment, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS
AND DEVELOPMENT 109 (R. H. Helmholz et al. eds., 1997).
59. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951); Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906); Louis C. Wyman, A Common Sense View of the Fifth
Amendment, 51 J. OF CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, AND POLICE SCI. 155, 155 (1960);
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 119 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006); 81 AM.
JUR. 2D Witnesses § 96 (2004).
60. GRISWOLD, supra note 58, at 8.
61. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 701 (1998) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
62. Id. at 702 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing DKT Memorial Fund Ltd.
v. Agency for Int‘l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (―[J]ust as our flag carries its
message . . . both at home and abroad, so does our Constitution and the
values it expresses.‖); United States v. Tiede, 86 F. R. D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for
Berlin 1979) (holding that a foreign national, accused of hijacking a Polish
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and statutory habeas corpus govern the custodian of the
prisoner rather than the prisoner herself,63 the Fifth
Amendment‘s command usually applies to the official rather
than the prisoner.
Two principles of constitutional law are in some tension
here: the first is the notion that even ―a case that may be of
extraordinary importance‖ should be ―resolved by ordinary
rules.‖64 The second is the fact that there is a difference
between torture as punishment and torture as a preventive
deterrent. If the two forms of torture are functionally different,
there is no uniform constitutional rule covering both situations.
One plausible exception is the prospect that constitutionallyapproved torture as punishment will be considered as
approving, a fortiori, the prospect of torture in tightly-defined
preventive scenarios. Torture as punishment might be an
―unnecessary or wanton infliction of pain‖ lacking in redeeming
penological purposes applicable to that particular criminal and
his crime(s).65 Sanctioning torture within that context might
prove to be a slippery slope. If the causality between torture
and penological purposes is defined loosely enough, many other
questionable treatments (aside from torture) could be
approved.
That entire line of decisions, consolidated by
Hudson v. McMillian, a case concerning the ―use of excessive
physical force against a prisoner,‖ asks ―whether force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,
or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.‖66
A prisoner need not, under Hudson, demonstrate that this
force caused a ―significant injury.‖67 The Supreme Court
rejected the contention, expressed in Justice Clarence Thomas‘s
dissenting opinion, that ―claims based on excessive force and
aircraft overseas, was entitled to the constitutional right of a jury trial when
tried under German law in a Berlin court created by the United States)).
63. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 494-95
(1973) (―The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks
relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful
custody.‖).
64. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 637 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part).
65. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).
66. Id. at 6 (1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21
(1986)).
67. Id. at 9.
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claims based on conditions of confinement are no different in
kind.‖68 The majority countered that ―[t]o deny . . . the
difference between punching a prisoner in the face and serving
him unappetizing food is to ignore the ‗concepts of dignity,
civilized standards, humanity, and decency that animate the
Eighth Amendment.‘‖69 The ―contextual‖ analysis bears upon a
proportional relationship between the conduct of the prisoner
and the response of the prison officials.70 The Hudson Court
refused unequivocally to resurrect the prison-inhabitation
mirror image of the confession-oriented Star Chamber‘s thirddegree treatment—―the inquisitorial method of putting the
accused upon his oath and compelling him to answer questions
designed to uncover uncharged offenses, without evidence from
another source.‖71 Nothing displaced the analogy even though
this treatment was to happen not pursuant to a legislative or
judicial order but upon the whim of prison officials.
Hudson is, by no means, sui generis.72 It was the product
of a long line of substantive Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
A bright star in this constellation is Trop v. Dulles, where a
plurality of the Supreme Court established the proposition that
the Amendment ―draw[s] its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.‖73
This manner of currently prevailing ―original
historicism‖ in interpreting the Amendment ―is characterized
by subtly calibrated, gradual modification of doctrine that
tracks changes in the public‘s settled convictions concerning

68. Id. at 11.
69. Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).
70. Id. at 8 (―What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause depends upon the claim at issue,
for two reasons. First, the general requirement that an Eighth Amendment
claimant allege and prove the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
should . . . be applied with due regard for differences in the kind of conduct
against which an Eighth Amendment objection is lodged. Second, the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments draws its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society, and so admits of few absolute limitations.‖ (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
71. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990).
72. Stare decisis requires contextual analysis whereby an aberration or
two from lines and lines of settled cases and, of course, from clearly opposite
constitutional text stand with far less precedential force than vice versa.
73. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality).
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specific types of punitive practices.‖74 Courts look to objective
evidence to confirm those conclusions,75 but they are also
required to ―bring their ‗own judgment . . . to bear.‘‖76 This
interpretive method presupposes, as it must, the ―normative
premise that [the ‗evolving standards‘] doctrine ought to be
adjusted to take into account enduring, widespread changes in
fundamental values when those changes are consistent with
the direction charted by the [F]ramers.‖77 In death penalty
cases, for instance, the Court has categorically exempted from
capital punishment certain classes of persons, namely minors,78
the mentally retarded,79 and the insane,80 as well as cases
involving the commission of non-homicidal person-on-person
crimes.81 In non-death penalty criminal cases, the Court has
established a ―narrow proportionality‖ test to analyze if the
punishment imposed is ―grossly disproportionate‖ to the
crime.82 And cases arising out of the prison context, such as
Estelle v. Gamble83 and Whitley v. Albers,84 reaffirm the
application of the evolving-standards prescription to the postsentencing, prison-inhabitation scenario.
Prison officials have more than an obligation not to invade
rights; they must also affirmatively protect the safety and
health of the prisoners, including their medical needs. If the
official conduct challenged in an Eighth Amendment suit ―d[id]
not conflict with competing administrative concerns‖ and ―force
74. William C. Heffernan, Constitutional Historicism: An Examination of
the Eighth Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Test, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
1355, 1390 (2005). See also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 82-83 (1921).
75. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (―[C]ourts should be
guided by objective factors that our cases have recognized.‖); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
76. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597
(1977) (plurality)).
77. Heffernan, supra note 74, at 1390 (emphasis added).
78. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), overruling Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
79. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), overruling Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
80. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
81. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
82. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
83. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
84. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
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was applied [not] in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline [but] maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm,‖ Eighth Amendment relief might be
available.85 These precedents, notably quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, establish a ―deliberate indifference‖ test to decide
whether an official‘s response overstepped the Eighth
Amendment‘s boundaries.86 We operate well outside that box
when torture is at issue. Creating a ―significant injury‖
requirement for triggering the Eighth Amendment would open
the city gates to ―some arbitrary quantity of injury‖—if that
threshold was not met, then ―the Eighth Amendment would
permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or
inhuman.‖87
In Estelle, the Supreme Court candidly announced that
forbidding torture and barbarous punishment was ―the primary
concern of the [Eighth Amendment‘s] drafters.‖88 Likewise, in
Wilkerson v. Utah, the Court ―affirm[ed] that punishments of
torture . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary
cruelty, are forbidden by‖ the Amendment.89 To the Wilkerson
Court, these ―punishments of torture,‖ characterized as
―atrocities,‖ involved situations where the defendant ―was
embowelled alive, beheaded, and quartered,‖ and cases ―of
public dissection . . . and burning alive.‖90 Surely, the state of
knowledge about torture at that point in history cannot limit
modern constitutional analysis to the 1791 baseline. It would
be one thing to state that there is no historical reference to
torture that falls within the Eighth Amendment‘s scope, and
only tangentially within the sweep of the Due Process Clause
(an argument which is unavailing), and quite another to
suggest that the definition of torture should be limited to what
was known by the Framers. The latter argument would
discredit originalism as unworkable and too academic to be
pragmatic, or simply as a flight of fancy. This is also the
85. Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
86. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-37 (1994).
87. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
88. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (referring to Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L.
REV. 839, 842 (1969)).
89. 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879) (citation omitted).
90. Id. at 135-36.
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reason that this Article does not attempt to construct a
comprehensive definition of torture.91
The constitutional law variant of the ejusdem generis
doctrine does not choke off all other forms of torture from being
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. At any rate, the
―evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society‖92 recognize that at the very least, while
paying due caution to the limited policing role of American
courts (both federal and state), torture as post-trial
punishment is unconstitutional and torture as a pre-trial
preventive interrogation technique raises serious constitutional
questions. Without adequate safeguards in place, the latter
concerns ossify into constitutional violations. Recognition of
these ―evolving standards‖ is at the forefront of proportionality
analysis through ―objective factors to the maximum possible
extent.‖93 The Supreme Court has ―pinpointed that the clearest
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is

91. Waterboarding, malnutrition, starvation, sexual abuse and
intimidation (including rape), homicide, battery, assault, usage of the ―Tucker
telephone,‖ incessant harassment, and the giving of cause to believe that the
interrogated or others will be harmed are forms of torture, but they do not
represent the whole picture. The events at Abu Ghraib, which came to public
attention, particularly stretched the imagination further and wider on this
front. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 14 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (prisoner abuse
within the Eighth Amendment includes ―lashing prisoners with leather
straps, whipping them with rubber hoses, beating them with naked fists,
shocking them with electric currents, asphyxiating them short of death,
intentionally exposing them to undue heat or cold, or forcibly injecting them
with psychosis-inducing drugs‖); Seymour Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib:
American Soldiers Brutalized Iraqis. How Far up does the Responsibility
Go?, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, available at http://www.newyorker.
com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact; HANIA MUFTI, HUMAN RTS. WATCH,
THE NEW IRAQ? TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN IRAQI CUSTODY
(Jan. 24, 2005), http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11864/section/ (―Methods of
torture or ill-treatment cited included routine beatings to the body using a
variety of implements such as cables, hosepipes and metal rods. Detainees
reported kicking, slapping and punching; prolonged suspension from the
wrists with the hands tied behind the back; electric shocks to sensitive parts
of the body, including the earlobes and genitals; and being kept blindfolded
and/or handcuffed continuously for several days. In several cases, the
detainees suffered what may be permanent physical disability.‖). See also
GAIL H. MILLER, DEFINING TORTURE 1 (2005).
92. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
93. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991) (quoting Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980)).
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the legislation enacted by the country‘s legislatures.‖94 The
Court has also retained the caveat that ―objective evidence,
though of great importance, d[oes] not wholly determine the
controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the end
our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability.‖95 While the first prong (looking to trend and
direction of the Nation‘s values to rectify one or two aberrant
jurisdictions) has a democratic flavor, the second prong
(judicial review against a Nation gone mad) gives us pause and
also the hope that this doctrine will be invoked only in the most
exceptional cases.
Along the same ―evolving standards‖ line of thinking, the
Supreme Court, in Weems v. United States, stated the
proposition as a ban ―against the infliction of punishment[s] so
severe as not to fit the crime.‖96 The proposition depends ―both
on account of th[e] degree and [the] kind‖97 of the punishment
imposed.
Connecting the dots for the Wilkerson rule,
furthermore, Weems held that the Eighth Amendment‘s
meaning is ―elastic,‖ ―indefinite‖ and ―must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth.‖98 The
Weems Court, referencing In re Kemmler, stated that
―[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death.‖99 Weems also referenced the English Bill of
Rights of 1689 as authority that proportionality analysis was a
goal of the English common law carried over to the American
colonies.100 Then, Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber defined
a ―cruel and unusual punishment‖ as that which, in
contravention of ―[t]he traditional humanity of modern AngloAmerican law,‖ nonetheless ―inflict[s] . . . unnecessary pain.‖101
Evidence of intent, in some cases, might be necessary to
94. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
96. 217 U.S. 349, 376 (1910) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. at 377.
98. Id. at 373 (―Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted,
it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general language should not,
therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken.
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.‖).
99. Id. at 370 (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)).
100. See id. at 402.
101. 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947).
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prove a constitutional violation, but if ―unnecessary pain‖
recurs over and over again and if reasonable safeguards are not
taken to diminish that possibility, then that creates a
constitutional violation. The torture as punishment issue
therefore is closer to the Farmer standard (―deliberate
indifference‖) than to the artificially cramped definition of
intent developed in some decisions. Discrimination occurs
when intent is ―‗because of,‘ not merely ‗in spite of,‘ [the
action‘s] adverse effects upon an identifiable group.‖102
As devised in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,103 the
Court applied this concept of intent in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,104
where it held that to prove discrimination, a detainee must
―show that petitioners adopted and implemented the detention
policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for
the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or
national origin‖ or otherwise violating the detainee‘s rights. In
Iqbal, which figures prominently in Part III (discussion of
qualified immunity), the Court explicitly notes that ―the
plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with
discriminatory purpose.‖105 However, the Court did not explain
whether a pattern of discriminatory effects (disparate impact),
especially in the face of easier alternatives which might abate
(or entirely rid society of) that discrimination, begins to appear
systematic.106
This is a matter of iterations and the
102. Pers. Adm‘r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (footnote omitted).
103. Id. at 256.
104. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948-49 (2009). See also id. at 1948 (―Under extant
precedent purposeful discrimination requires more than ‗intent as volition or
intent as awareness of consequences.‘‖ (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279)).
105. Id. at 1948.
106. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 540 (1993) (―Relevant evidence includes, among other things, the
historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of
events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the
legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements
made by members of the [decision-making] body. These objective factors bear
on the question of discriminatory object.‖ (citations omitted)); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (―[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may
often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it
is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another. It is also
not infrequently true that the discriminatory impact . . . may for all practical
purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because, in various circumstances,
the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds.‖). For an
illustrative piece demonstrating the issues litigators face trying to prove
―intent‖ in disparate impact cases, see also William Cohen, Proving
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consideration applies to methods, duration and conditions of
torture, all of which attend a due process or an Eighth
Amendment analysis of pre-trial torture‘s constitutionality.
Even though torture to impose punishment is
constitutionally out-of-bounds, the constitutionality of torture
as a preventive deterrent is more complex. Context matters.107
The level of scrutiny that a government policy invites depends,
as a broad (if nebulous) rule, on ―the constitutional and societal
importance of the interest adversely affected and the
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
Rational basis scrutiny, as
classification is drawn.‖108
understood by the Supreme Court‘s presently governing law,
might sustain well-regulated and time- and means-limited
torture for the sole or primary purpose of future terrorism
prevention. That degree of judicial care when reviewing the
constitutionality of government actions merely asks whether
there was a plausible reason for the government to act the way
it did. So long as the law does not discriminate on the basis of
race, sex, sexual orientation or other prohibited characteristics,
the policy or law will be sustained.109
Some of those
characteristics might be the residency of the entity (states may
not discriminate on that basis) or the differential structuring of
Discriminatory Intent in Constitutional Law Disparate Impact Cases, 14
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 78 (1991).
107. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998)
(―Deliberate indifference that shocks in one environment may not be so
patently egregious in another, and our concern with preserving the
constitutional proportions of substantive due process demands an exact
analysis of circumstances before any abuse of power is condemned as
conscience-shocking.‖). ―[A]ttention to the markedly different circumstances
of normal pretrial custody and high-speed law enforcement chases shows why
the deliberate indifference that shocks in the one case is less egregious in the
other (even assuming that it makes sense to speak of indifference as
deliberate in the case of sudden pursuit).‖ Id. at 851. The Estelle context is
the ―normal pretrial custody‖ while the Lewis context is the ―high-speed law
enforcement chase[ ].‖ See id.
108. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (―[T]he Equal
Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for
the classification, the legislative facts on which the classification is
apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the
governmental [decision-maker], and the relationship of the classification to
its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or
irrational.‖ (citations omitted)).
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tax laws.110
What happens under strict scrutiny? First, the deterrent
effect of torture must be established as a compelling
governmental interest, in light of the current situation and the
information possessed by the officials in charge at the time;
and, secondly, torture must be the narrowest and least drastic
means of furthering that interest.111 But such analysis is
extremely fact-specific, and penalizing officials post-hoc carries
the risk of illegitimacy. We are, by that time, temporally
disconnected from the imminent and time-sensitive decisionmaking that the officials were required to undertake; judging
these executive decisions in hindsight is risky. Based on
existing case-law on prison officials‘ qualified immunity claims,
there will be a presumption in the vast majority of cases that
the officials acted responsibly in light of the facts and risks
then-present before them. Hudson and Whitley, themselves,
planted that seed: prison officials are often required to act ―in
haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a
second chance‖112 and those determinations (unless
―malicious[s] or sadisti[c]‖113) deserve deference. There might
be all the more reason that the presumption will carry over to
the government official in the ticking-bomb torture context.
That does the torturee no good.

110. See Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass‘n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 107
(2003) (―The law in question does not distinguish on the basis of, for example,
race or gender. It does not distinguish between in-state and out-of-state
businesses. Neither does it favor a State‘s long-time residents at the expense
of residents who have more recently arrived from other States.‖ (citations
omitted)). See also FCC v. Beach Commc‘ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)
(―In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither
proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights
must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification.‖); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527
(1959) (the Equal Protection Clause requires state tax laws to ―proceed upon
a rational basis‖ and not to ―resort to a classification that is palpably
arbitrary‖).
111. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235
(1995) (―Federal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a
compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further
that interest.‖).
112. Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (quoting Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)).
113. Id. at 6 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21).
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C. Relevance of the Self-Incrimination Privilege
Past conduct is forbidden fruit under this exceedingly
limited detour from ordinary standards of due process.114
Admitting into evidence confessions derived from torture would
eviscerate the fine line-drawing attempted here, and effectively
obviate the Supreme Court‘s landmark decisions in Brown v.
Mississippi115 and Miranda v. Arizona.116 These decisions
render inadmissible statements (both inculpatory and
exculpatory) attained through violence, coercion, or asymmetry
of information that might induce fear. Brown was based on
due process (before the Fifth Amendment was incorporated to
apply to the States) and Miranda was based on the Fifth
Amendment, which had been directly incorporated by the
Fourteenth to apply to the States. Purposively-speaking,
however, what Brown read the Constitution to require,
Miranda converted into a ―prophylactic‖ rule,117 thus bridging
the strait between Brown and its enforcement. Despite the
criticism and judicial trimming that Miranda has endured in
the years since, its core remains alive.118
114. See, e.g., David Luban, Essay, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking
Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1436 (2005) (―The crucial difference lies in the fact
that the confession is backward-looking, in that it aims to document and
ratify the past for purposes of retribution, while intelligence gathering is
forward-looking because it aims to gain information to forestall future evils
like terrorist attacks.‖); Gross, supra note 22, at 1487-88.
115. 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding that confessions exacted by torture
and police violence violate due process and may not be admitted into trial as
evidence).
116. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that defendant must be informed of
her right to an attorney and her privilege against self-incrimination before
and during questioning by police; otherwise, inculpatory and exculpatory
statements gained from such questioning are inadmissible).
117. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 652-53 (1984).
118. The Supreme Court and individual Justices have, in a variety of
cases, said, in effect, that Miranda rights are merely ―prophylactic,‖ designed
to stop Fifth Amendment violations (and ―not themselves rights protected by
the Constitution.‖). See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
Nevertheless, in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), the Court
expressly reaffirmed Miranda. But see Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,
457-58 (1994) (holding that a defendant who was given a Miranda warning
must explicitly demand an attorney in order to cease interrogation so that
counsel could be present); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690-91 (1993)
(―Miranda‟s safeguards are not constitutional in character.‖); Duckworth v.
Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (holding that Miranda warnings need not be
given in the exact form described in Miranda, but simply must reasonably
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Even if one does not support the formalist difference
between applying the self-incrimination privilege in an
interrogation context as opposed to the trial itself, it is indeed a
privilege against self-incrimination. Of their own volition,
some States permit and some even mandate testimonial
protection for certain relationships, such as spousal and
parent-child kinships. Neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth
Amendment has been held to require such protections.
Consequently, there exists no constitutionally-guaranteed
privilege against incriminating others, absent such a provision
being affirmatively made by positive law enacted by the States
and by Congress.
Like in the Sixth Amendment‘s
Confrontation Clause context,119 the self-incrimination test
requires that the statement or information secured from the
defendant be ―testimonial.‖120 Both the Confrontation Clause
and the Self-Incrimination Clause define ―witness‖ (or
―witnesses‖) broadly enough to strike out most categories of
out-of-court testimony, many of which are practically
unreliable and all of which are constitutionally unreliable.121
convey to a suspect his rights); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528
(1987) (―[T]he Miranda Court adopted prophylactic rules designed to insulate
the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights . . . .‖); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 306 (1985) (holding that ―[w]here a Fourth Amendment violation ‗taints‘
the confession, a finding of voluntariness for the purposes of the Fifth
Amendment is merely a threshold requirement in determining whether the
confession may be admitted in evidence‖ (citation omitted)); Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 492 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in result)
(recognizing Miranda as a general prophylactic rule).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (―In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . .
.‖). See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (―Various
formulations of this core class of testimonial statements exist: ex parte incourt testimony or its functional equivalent — that is, material such as
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements . . .
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, or confessions . . . statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial . . . .‖ (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000) (―The
word ‗witness‘ in the constitutional text limits the relevant category of
compelled incriminating communications to those that are ‗testimonial‘ in
character.‖).
121. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (―The central
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Imagine how this type of reliability inquiry could affect
constitutional provisions that establish specific requirements
without giving courts discretion to evaluate alleged violations.
Arguably, courts could someday say that what matters in
interpreting the Ex Post Facto Clause122 is not the actual
temporal order of the legislation enacted and the crime
committed, but rather whether the legislature had a specific
malicious intent in enacting the law after the commission of a
crime. Similarly, the admittance of ex parte testimony into
trial is presumptively unconstitutional. So serious and harsh
is the office of Star Chamber-like ecclesiastical tribunals in
Anglo-American history123 that the Supreme Court has
expansively extended the self-incrimination privilege.
The Court has accomplished this project by expanding the
scope of the terms ―testimonial‖ evidence and ―witness.‖124
concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the
evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in
the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.‖).
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (federal prohibition); U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1 (states). See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003); Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1798) (Chase, J.) (―I will state what laws I consider
ex post facto laws, within the words and the intent of the prohibition. 1st.
Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d.
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offence, in order to convict the offender. All these, and similar laws, are
manifestly unjust and oppressive.‖ (emphasis added)). The ―manifestly
unjust and oppressive‖ depiction, though subjective, is immaterial here
because it is a descriptive rather than controlling rule to apply. Similarly, in
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 137-38 (1810), the Court saw the Ex Post Facto
Clause as a safeguard against ―violent acts which might grow out of the
feelings of the moment.‖
123. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *266 (Star chamber ―consist[ed] of diverse lords spiritual and
temporal, being privy counselors, together with two judges of the courts of
common law, without the intervention of any jury. Their jurisdiction
extended legally over riots, perjury, misbehavior of sheriffs, and other
notorious misdemeanors, contrary to the laws of the land‖).
124. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 50 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (―[T]he term ‗witness‘ meant a person who gives or furnishes
evidence, a broader meaning than that which our case law currently ascribes
to the term. If this is so, a person who responds to a subpoena duces tecum
would be just as much a ‗witness‘ as a person who responds to a subpoena ad
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Justice Joseph Story used the phrases ―to give evidence‖ and
―to furnish evidence‖ to explain self-incrimination.125 This
right has not been confined to what the defendant said or did
not say (literally or verbally) once in custody or on the witness
stand. Even the act-of-production doctrine ―provides that
persons compelled to turn over incriminating papers or other
physical evidence pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum or a
summons may invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination as a bar to production‖ when ―the act of
producing the evidence would contain ‗testimonial features.‘‖126
The case of Counselman v. Hitchcock went so far as to hold that
an ―ancient principle of the law‖ is that ―a witness shall not be
compelled, in any proceeding, to make disclosures or to give
testimony which will tend to criminate him or subject him to
fines, penalties or forfeitures.‖127
English common law recognized that this giving of
testimony or evidence encompassed the coerced production of
archives, books, and records.
The state constitutional
conventions were aware of this line of English cases
interspersed throughout the 18th century.128 This terminology,
in meaning if not in text, shares a certain kinship with the
Fourth Amendment‘s protection of ―persons, houses, papers
testificandum. Dictionaries published around the time of the founding
included definitions of the term ‗witness‘ as a person who gives or furnishes
evidence. Legal dictionaries of that period defined ‗witness‘ as someone who
‗gives evidence in a cause.‘ 2 G. Jacob, A New Law-Dictionary (8th ed. 1762);
2 T. Cunningham, New and Complete Law-Dictionary (2d ed. 1771); T. Potts,
A Compendious Law Dictionary 612 (1803); 6 G. Jacob, The Law-Dictionary
450 (T. Tomlins 1st American ed. 1811). And a general dictionary published
earlier in the century similarly defined ‗witness‘ as ‗a giver of evidence.‘ J.
Kersey, A New English Dictionary (1702). The term ‗witness‘ apparently
continued to have this meaning at least until the first edition of Noah
Webster‘s dictionary, which defined it as ‗that which furnishes evidence or
proof.‘ An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828).‖ (emphasis
added)).
125. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 931 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., Carolina Academic
Press 1987) (1833).
126. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
127. 142 U.S. 547, 563-64 (1892) (citations omitted).
128. Justice Thomas‘s concurring opinion in Hubbell does a remarkable
job of reciting this history. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 52-53 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (discussing various states‘ declarations affirming the right
against self-incrimination during the pre-constitutional period).
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and effects‖ (which cannot be unreasonably searched or subject
to seizure).129
That Amendment historically insists on
protecting the dignity of the individual130 by employing the
―reasonableness inquiry,‖131 which evaluates the nature of the
arrest and detention (including treatment) and the available
evidence.
Both the history and the public policy arguments
underlying the Self-Incrimination Clause maintain that the
privilege may be invoked ―to resist compelled explicit or
implicit disclosures of incriminating information. Historically,
the privilege was intended to prevent the use of legal
compulsion to extract from the accused a sworn communication
of facts which would incriminate him.‖132 ―The 18th-century
common-law privilege against self-incrimination protected
against the compelled production of incriminating physical
evidence such as papers and documents‖133 and in this digital
era, it now extends to private electronic data. At the end of the
day, the interrogated then finds herself in an unenviable
Catch-22: if she concedes her involvement, then she may be
charged. Alternatively, if the interrogated declines to claim
involvement, then the privilege either becomes too watered
down or does not apply at all.
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the selfincrimination privilege, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
prohibits using pre-trial torture to secure evidence of the
129. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
130. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 381 (1993) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (there is significant doubt as to ―whether the fiercely proud
men who adopted our Fourth Amendment would have allowed themselves to
be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, to such
indignity‖).
131. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 361 (2001)
(O‘Connor, J., dissenting) (courts have a constitutional obligation to ―evaluate
the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual‘s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests‖ (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)). See also id. at 347 (majority opinion) (―[The
specific litigant‘s] claim to live free of pointless indignity and confinement
clearly outweighs anything the [arresting authority] can raise against it
specific to her case.‖).
132. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 34 n.8 (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S.
201, 212 (1988)).
133. Id. at 51 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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suspect‘s culpability.
The Court‘s Eighth Amendment
precedents similarly proscribe post-trial torture, irrespective of
whether ―significant injury‖ is caused. With respect to the
torture warrants, this analysis receives further comment in
Part III.
Moreover, there remains a practical imperative to borrow
from international and foreign law in order to understand the
ramifications of our own question. To properly delineate the
United States‘ governing constitutional law on the question of
torture in a ticking-bomb scenario, we must not be insulated
from the rest of the world. Relevant are the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (―UNCAT‖),134 the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,135 the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),136 and the
Geneva Conventions137—and the State practices of Israel and
other terrorism-challenged foreign jurisdictions.
For example, let us make the effort to define ―torture,‖ a
question sure to arise under an Eighth Amendment challenge
in United States federal courts.
How the international
authorities listed above define ―torture‖ is not, in substantial
part, so predicated upon foreign countries‘ unique histories and
practices that the United States‘ constitutional doctrine finds
nothing to learn from them. Is it relevant to United States
courts that the UNCAT defines ―torture‖ as:
134. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by
resolution of the U.N. General Assembly December 19, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46,
at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987).
In October 1994, the United States ratified the UNCAT with the reservation
that it will conform only to the extent required by the Eighth Amendment.
135. See generally G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71-77, U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec.
10, 1948).
136. See generally G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. (Dec.
16, 1966).
137. See Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516. ―Torture of prisoners
of war and others detained during wartime is prohibited by the third Geneva
Convention protecting prisoners of war and the fourth Geneva Convention,
which protects civilians during wartime.‖ Bell, supra note 22, at 343 n.14.
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any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information
or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a
third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, or intimidating or coercing
him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind?138
Is it relevant for our qualified immunity jurisprudence (certain
to be claimed by government officials to avoid monetary
damages) that the UNCAT forbids ―pain or suffering . . .
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity‖?139 In addition, does it matter that the
UNCAT‘s ban on torture is absolute, non-derogable, and admits
of ―[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever‖?140 Each of
these questions should be answered in the affirmative.
Shared humanity is another precept of human dignity,
which is itself a resonating and recurring theme in the torture
debate. Human intricacies that we hold in common, the
torturee‘s physical and mental responses to torture, and the
law‘s own responsiveness to these details are not somehow
worthless or unavailable to United States courts because the
conversation first arose elsewhere. On this important issue,
United States courts and jurists must be careful to receive
influence from, in addition to exerting influence on, the
Western community. Our relationship with the legal and
political systems must be cautionary but cannot be parasitic.
In order for our worldview to be relevant to the European
Court of Human Rights or to France‘s Cour de cassation, we
must engage with their perspectives. Their views are not
binding on United States courts, but they are relevant. They
help confirm the validity (or lack thereof) of our own
conclusions, they are at least as valuable as law review articles,
138. G.A. Res. 39/46, supra note 134, at 197.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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and they serve as ―common denominators of basic fairness
governing relationships between the governors and the
governed.‖141 Such comparative constitutional references help
courts better understand the process or subject of an
immediate case. Recently there has been much debate and
discourse in the United States over the propriety of our courts
taking other Western tribunals‘ views into account.
One criticism is that judges who are not nominated by the
President of the United States nor confirmed by the Senate, as
required by the Constitution (in Article II, Section 2, cl. 2),
should not influence, causally or as confirmatory evidence, the
judicial outcomes in American courts. That view is logically
Another illogical argument is that these
inconsistent.142
international authorities should not be considered because they
have not been accepted by the President or ratified by a twothirds majority of the Senate, which are the requirements for
adopting a treaty (also required in Article II, Section 2, cl. 2 of
the Constitution).143 United States courts could obviate the
whole controversy regarding their references to and citations of
foreign and international law by not doing so explicitly. They
always could do so sub silentio and no one would be the wiser
(or, at least, be able to conclusively prove it). In fact, Professor
Laurence Tribe does characterize the Supreme Court‘s recent
141. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, U.S. Supreme Court Assoc. Justice,
Speech to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law:
―A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind‖: The Value of a
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (Apr. 1, 2005),
http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg050401.html (quoting Patricia M.
Wald, The Use of International Law in the American Adjudicative Process, 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 431, 442 (2004)).
142. Law professors, law students, and sometimes non-lawyers also
influence the work of courts when judges read and are persuaded by their
books or law review articles. At least since the legal realism heyday, many
law schools have retained on their faculties economists, philosophers,
psychologists, and other social scientists sans legal backgrounds. If the
argument is that their work-products are based on American law, that is
unavailing. Sometimes the judges themselves are persuaded, directly or from
legal literature, by non-legal literature. This very Article, for instance, refers
to works by Michel Foucault, Talal Asad, and Jean Améry, none of whom are
lawyers or experts in American law.
Applying the anti-foreign and
international law refrain (in United States constitutional cases) across the
board would leave the constitutional reasoning of American courts too
insular.
143. Once again, those references are not binding on United States
courts the way that a treaty is.
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usage of foreign-law as confirmatory evidence for the Court‘s
conclusions in the most obvious sense; the Court‘s mind is
made up and the approbatory international law citation is just
―icing on cakes that [the Court] insist[s] ha[s] already been
baked.‖144
Still, refusing to cite international or foreign legal
developments would not only be intellectually disingenuous,
but it would also rob United States courts of the transparency
for which they are revered and appreciated worldwide. The
United States would be poorer for it, owing to a parochial
perspective.145 Moreover, the relationships between United
States law and the legal frameworks of other nations,
especially on the crucial issues of human rights and torture,
are symbiotic. It simply cannot be that the time-tested Geneva
Conventions, the UNCAT, and the judicial decisions of nations
such as Israel, which confront terror threats daily, have no
importance in American courts‘ analysis of torture‘s
constitutionality. Lord Atkins of the British Law Lords
rejected automatic administrative detention during World War
II146 and President Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court rejected
the constitutionality of torture in ticking bomb scenarios147—
144. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 187 (2008).
See also id. at 186 (the outrage against foreign legal citations in American
federal courts may well be the product of jurisprudential ―antiglobalism‖ and
―the evidently rising national anxiety about immigration, the outsourcing of
important economic activities to businesses and employees overseas, and the
decline of American prestige abroad in the wake of the Iraq war,‖ rather than
any principled American exceptionalism in law).
145. We might learn from the good and the bad in the practices and
histories of other jurisdictions. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 141; Kim
Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for
Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence through Negative Models, 1 INT‘L J.
CONST. L. 296 (2003).
146. See Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] 206 A.C. 244 (H.L.) (Atkins, L.J.,
dissenting) (―In this country amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent.
They may be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace.
It has always been one of the pillars of freedom, one of the principles of
liberty for which we are now fighting, that the judges . . . stand between the
subject and any attempted encroachments on his liberty by the executive,
alert to see that any coercive action is justified in law.‖).
147. See HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov‘t of Isr.
[1999] IsrLR 36, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/94/000/
051/a09/94051000.a09.pdf (―This is the destiny of a democracy—it does not
see all means as acceptable, and the ways of its enemies are not always open
before it. A democracy must sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its
back. Even so, a democracy has the upper hand. The rule of law and the
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refuting Cicero‘s categorical statement that inter arma silent
leges.148
The need to learn from Israel—about the issue of balancing
national security with constitutional ideals related to
individual freedoms—should be obvious to American
constitutional courts. It is well-known that
Israel finds itself in the middle of difficult battle
against a furious wave of terrorism. Israel is
exercising its right of self defense. This combat
is not taking place in a normative void. It is
being carried out according to the rules of
international law, which provide principles and
rules for combat activity.149
Israeli jurists, who incessantly face the torture and terrorism
questions, might know a thing or two. It is not that American
courts will necessarily agree with or find relevant Israeli
judges‘ constructions of their own constitutional text on the
torture question, but these constructions should be considered
persuasive authority, establishing that the Supreme Court of a
terrorism-challenged democratic state like Israel has not
barred terrorism or torture challenges on justiciability
grounds.150 The court has considered whether ―the state may
liberty of an individual constitute important components in its understanding
of security.‖). See also HCJ 320/80 Kwasama v. Minister of Def. IsrSC 5(3)
113, 132 (Cohen, J.) (―What distinguishes the war of the State from the war
of its enemies is that the State fights while upholding the law, whereas its
enemies fight while violating the law. The moral strength and objective
justness of the Government‘s war depend entirely on upholding the laws of
the State: by conceding this strength and this justness, the Government
serves the purposes of the enemy.‖).
148. Latin for ―in battle, the laws are silent.‖ See CICERO, PRO MILONE
16 (N.H. Watts trans., Harvard Univ. Press, 5th ed. 1972).
149. HCJ 3451/02 Almadani v. IDF Commander in Judea & Samaria
[2002] IsrLR 5-6 (citation omitted), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/
files_eng/02/510/034/a06/02034510.a06.pdf.
150. See, e.g., AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 293-94 (2006)
(―We have not used the act of state doctrine or non-justiciability under these
circumstances. We consider these issues on their merits. Nor do we require
injury in fact as a standing requirement; we recognize the standing of anyone
to challenge the act. In the context of terrorism, the Israeli Supreme Court
has ruled on petitions concerning the power of the state to arrest suspected
terrorists and the conditions of their confinement. It has ruled on petitions
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forcibly relocate residents of an occupied territory who pose a
threat to state security;‖151 how ―freedom and dignity of
someone whom the state wishes to confine in administrative
detention‖ might be ensured;152 the limited expertise of a court
to inquire into military necessities;153 and whether torture is
ever permissible (as preventive interrogation or as
punishment).154
To this last question, the Israeli Supreme Court responded
with a resounding negative. Such considerations go to the
relevance of the available alternatives when a torture proposal
is afoot. They remain interspersed with the elephant in the
concerning the rights of suspected terrorists to legal representation and the
means by which they may be interrogated.‖ (citations omitted)).
151. See HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the West Bank [2002]
IsrLR 33, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/150/070/
A15/02070150.a15.pdf (―A delicate and sensitive balance is required. This is
the price of democracy. It is expensive, but worthwhile. It strengthens the
State. It provides a reason for its struggle.‖). See also HCJ 5973/92 Ass‘n for
Civil Rights in Isr. v. Minister of Def. [1993], available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/92/730/059/Z01/92059730.z01.pdf
(invalidating a deportation order devised without a proper hearing and due
process and ordering a post-factum right to such a hearing).
152. CrimA 7048/97 Anonymous v. Minister of Def. [2000] IsrLR 11,
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/97/480/070/a09/97070480.a
09.pdf (―With that, there is no escape – in a freedom and security seeking
democratic society – from the balancing of liberty and dignity and security.
Human rights must not be turned into an axe for denying public and national
security. A balance is required – a delicate and difficult balance – between
the liberty and the dignity of the individual and national security and public
safety. This balancing presumes – and in the petition before us the matter
has not come up at all – that it is possible to enable – in a democratic freedom
and security seeking state – the administrative detention of a person from
whom a danger to national security is posed, but this possibility is not to be
extended to the detention of a person from whom no danger is posed to
national security and who merely constitutes a ‗bargaining chip.‘‖ (citations
omitted)).
153. HCJ 7015/02, Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the W. Bank [2002]
IsrSC, available at elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/150/070/a15/02070150.a15.
pdf (―In exercising this judicial review, we do not appoint ourselves as experts
in security matters. We do not replace the security considerations of the
military commander with our own security considerations. We do not adopt
any position with regard to the manner in which security matters are
conducted. Our role is to ensure that boundaries are not crossed and that the
conditions that restrict the discretion of the military commander are upheld.‖
(citations omitted)).
154. See HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov‘t of Isr.
[1999] IsrLR 11, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/94/000/051/
a09/94051000.a09.pdf.
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courtroom: the institutional and jurisdictional competence of
the Judicial Branch to decide questions involving national
security.
Delineating between legal and constitutional
questions (which are within judicial competence) and national
security questions (which are not) is no easy feat, but the
Israeli Supreme Court has navigated this minefield
successfully.155 The Court has required proportionality of
government need with action harming property and a due
process hearing unless it interferes with imminent military
necessity—occasionally permissible only as a preventive
measure, not as collective retribution or punishment against
the residents.156 Most notably, in Morcos v. Minister of
Defence,157 the Tribunal invoked the equality principle in
invalidating the disparate distribution of gas masks in the
West Bank during the Gulf War.158 That case fell squarely
within the judicial province and is a contemplative lesson of
Wars on Terror universally.
In this area, ―engaging foreign and international law may
assist in questioning our own understanding of the [American]
Constitution by . . .(1) comparing the consequences of different
interpretive approaches, (2) clarifying ‗the distinctive function
of one‘s own system;‘ and (3) illuminating the dimensions of the
universal constitutional rights.‖159 Finally, since courts are
155. See HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the West Bank [2002]
IsrLR 24, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/150/070/A15/
02070150.a15.pdf (―In exercising this judicial review, we do not appoint
ourselves as experts in security matters. We do not replace the security
considerations of the military commander with our own security
considerations. We do not adopt any position with regard to the manner in
which security matters are conducted. Our role is to ensure that boundaries
are not crossed and that the conditions that restrict the discretion of the
military commander are upheld.‖ (citations omitted)).
156. See HCJ 5510/92 Turkeman v. Minister of Def. [1993] IsrSC 48(1)
217; see also DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME
COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 184-86 (2002).
157. HCJ 168/91 [1991] IsrSC 45(1) 467.
158. Id. at 470-71.
159. Roger P. Alford, Four Mistakes in the Debate on “Outsourcing
Authority,” 69 ALB. L. REV. 653, 658 n.34 (2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Vicki C. Jackson, Comment, Constitutional Comparisons:
Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 116-18 (2005)).
See also Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional
Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT‘L L. 82, 87 (2004) (―From the suprapositive
perspective, the interpretive value of international human rights norms and
decisions derives from the normative insight that they provide. The
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usually path-dependent to follow through with the logic of Case
A to Cases B, C, D and so on, looking to the courts of another
jurisdiction and anticipating the scope and range of cases likely
to arise in one‘s own jurisdiction is not only prudent, but
imperative. It should not, for example, hurt American courts to
envision the forms of interrogative techniques that the United
Kingdom was accused of inflicting upon certain Irish
Republican Army prisoners and to consider how the European
Court of Human Rights reasoned through that dispute.160 The
United States will lose influence on the world stage,161 if its
federal judiciary declines to show ―a decent [r]espect to the
[o]pinions of [human]kind.‖162 I will now move on to the
histories of the Eighth Amendment and habeas corpus.

interpreter should carefully examine whether the international conception of
the right (or the feature at issue) rests primarily on consensual or
institutional factors rather than on normative considerations, and whether
its normative foundations are compatible with the basic assumptions of the
U.S. constitutional system.‖).
160. See Bell, supra note 23, at 345 (―1) [H]ooding at all times except
during interrogation; 2) deprivation of sleep prior to interrogation; 3) holding
the detainees prior to their interrogation in a room where there was a loud
hissing sound; 4) wall-standing — that is, forcing detainees to stand against a
wall for hours; and 5) subjecting detainees to reduced food and drink.‖
(referring to Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep.
25 (1978))).
161. See Adam Liptak, U.S. Court is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at A1 (―The signature innovations of the American
legal system — a written Constitution, a Bill of Rights protecting individual
freedoms and an independent judiciary with the power to strike down
legislation — have been consciously emulated in much of the world. And
American constitutional law has been cited and discussed in countless
decisions of courts in Australia, Canada, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, New
Zealand, South Africa and elsewhere.‖); Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging:
The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 114
(2002) (―[M]ost justices of the United States Supreme Court do not cite
foreign case law in their judgments. They fail to make use of an important
source of inspiration, one that enriches legal thinking, makes law more
creative, and strengthens the democratic ties and foundations of different
legal systems.‖).
162. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (―When
in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one People to
dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with another, and to
assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to
which the Laws of Nature and of Nature‘s God entitle them, a decent Respect
to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they should declare the causes
which impel them to the Separation.‖).
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II. History of the Eighth Amendment and Habeas Corpus:
Applied to Citizens and Non-Citizens Alike
Enacted December 16, 1689, the English Bill of Rights
stated that ―excessive bail ought not to be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.‖163 Section 9 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights
adopted the words verbatim.164 Subsequently, ―eight other
states [(including Delaware,165 Maryland,166 New Hampshire,167
North Carolina,168 Massachusetts,169 Pennsylvania,170 and
163. 6 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS, 1660-1774, at 122, 124 (Andrew
Browning ed., 2d ed. 1996). The English Bill of Rights characterized laws
invading this guarantee as ―utterly and directly contrary to the known laws
and statutes and freedom of this realm.‖ Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 389 (1910).
164. VA. CONST. of 1776, § 9, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 3813 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909)
[hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
165. 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 164, at 569 (―Sec.
11. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
punishments inflicted; and in the construction of jails a proper regard shall
be had to the health of prisoners.‖).
166. 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 164, at 1688
(―XIV. That sanguinary laws ought to be avoided, as far as is consistent with
the safety of the state; and no law to inflict cruel and unusual pains and
penalties ought to be made in any case, or at any time hereafter . . . . XXII.
That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel or unusual punishments inflicted, by the courts of law.‖).
167. 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 164, at 2456-57
(―XVIII. All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offense.
No wise legislature will affix the same punishment to the crimes of theft,
forgery, and the like, which they do to those of murder and treason; where
the same undistinguishing severity is exerted against all offense, the people
are led to forget the real distinction in the crimes themselves, and to commit
the most flagrant with as little compunction as they do those of the lightest
dye. For the same reason, a multitude of sanguinary laws is both impolitic
and unjust. The true design of all punishments being to reform, not to
exterminate, mankind . . . . XXXIII. No magistrate or court of law shall
demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or
unusual punishments.‖).
168. 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 164, 2788
(generally prohibiting ―cruel or unusual punishments‖).
169. 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 164, at 1892
(―XXVI. No magistrate or court of law shall demand excessive bail or sureties,
impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punishments.‖).
170. 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 164, at 3101 (―Sec.
13. That excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
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South Carolina171)] adopted the clause, the federal government
inserted it into the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,172 and it
became the [E]ighth [A]mendment to the United States
Constitution in 1791.‖173 In his concurring opinion in Furman
v. Georgia, Justice William O. Douglas acknowledged that
contemporary debates ―throw little light on its intended
meaning‖.‖174 One constitutional scholar imputes the dearth of
debate about the words ―cruel and unusual punishment‖—at
both the First Congress and the state ratification
conventions—to the intuition that, by the time of the Founding,
the phrase had become ―constitutional boilerplate.‖175 This
supposed lack of controversy about the meaning of ―cruel and
unusual punishment‖ may suggest why the Supreme Court has
not thought it necessary to evaluate the constitutionality of
torture as punishment—that sentiment is encompassed by the
very words of the Eighth Amendment.
Of course, correlation is not equivalent to causation, and
the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition on torture cannot
necessarily be assumed. Nonetheless, repeated and identical
assertions about English history throughout the chain of
documents leading up to the Eighth Amendment make such a
deduction textually clear and more than just inferential.176
cruel punishments inflicted.‖).
171. 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 164, at 3264 (―Sec.
4. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
punishments inflicted.‖).
172. U.S.C.A. Northwest Ordinance, art. II (1787).
173. Granucci, supra note 88, at 840 (internal footnotes added).
174. 408 U.S. 238, 244 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
175. Granucci, supra note 88, at 840 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
176. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463
(1947) (―Prohibition against the wanton infliction of pain has come into our
law from the Bill of Rights of 1688. The identical words appear in our Eighth
Amendment.‖); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 394-95 (1910) (White,
J., dissenting) (―The substantial identity between the provisions of these
several constitutions or Bills of Rights shows beyond doubt that their
meaning was understood; that is to say, that the significance attributed to
them in the mother country as the result of the Bill of Rights of 1689 was
appreciated, and that it was intended, in using the identical words, to give
them the same well-understood meaning. . . . [T]he New Hampshire Bill of
Rights contains a clause admonishing as to the wisdom of the apportionment
of punishment of crime according to the nature of the offense, but in marked
contrast to the re-enactment, in express and positive terms, of the cruel and
unusual punishment clause of the English Bill of Rights, the provision as to
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They highlight that, at least in the real world, the Eighth
Amendment does not merely demand proportionality between
the crime committed and the punishment imposed, but also
that certain absolute limitations govern. The development of
those limitations has followed the ―evolving standards,‖
constitutional-development approach.177 In addition to torture,
those limitations include categorical prohibitions on the death
penalty for certain types of crimes (non-homicidal person-onperson crimes in the civilian context) and for certain classes of
criminals (the mentally insane, the mentally retarded, and
minors). The English Bill of Rights concerned itself with the
selective, random or irregular application of harsh penalties,
and its goal was ―to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory
penalties of a severe nature.‖178 Professor Anthony F. Granucci
explains the history as follows:
Following the Norman conquest of England
in 1066, the old system of penalties, which
ensured equality between crime and punishment,
suddenly disappeared. By the time systematic
judicial records were kept, its demise was almost
complete. With the exception of certain grave
crimes for which the punishment was death or
outlawry, the arbitrary fine was replaced by a
discretionary
amercement.
Although
amercement‘s discretionary character allowed
the circumstances of each case to be taken into
account and the level of cash penalties to be
decreased or increased accordingly, the
amercement presented an opportunity for
excessive or oppressive fines.
The problem of excessive amercements
became so prevalent that three chapters of the
Magna Carta were devoted to their regulation.
Maitland said of Chapter 14 that ―very likely
apportionment is merely advisory, additionally demonstrating the precise
and accurate conception then entertained of the nature and character of the
prohibition adopted from the English Bill of Rights.‖).
177. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
178. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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there was no clause in the Magna Carta more
grateful to the mass of the people.‖ Chapter 14
clearly stipulated as fundamental law a
prohibition of excessiveness in punishments: A
free man shall not be amerced for a trivial
offence, except in accordance with the degree of
the offence; and for a serious offence he shall be
amerced according to its gravity . . . .179
From the debates of the First Congress, we observe the
following exchange:
Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina, objected to the
words ‗―nor cruel and unusual punishments;‘‖ the
import of them being too indefinite.
Mr. LIVERMORE[:] The clause seems to express
a great deal of humanity, on which account I
have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no
meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. What
is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who are to
be the judges? What is understood by excessive
fines? It lies with the court to determine. No
cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted;
it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains
often deserve whipping, and perhaps having
their ears cut off; but are we in future to be
prevented from inflicting these punishments
because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of
correcting vice and deterring others from the
commission of it could be invented, it would be
very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but
until we have some security that this will be
done, we ought not to be restrained from making
necessary laws by any declaration of this kind.180
At the Massachusetts convention, debating over the Eighth
179. Granucci, supra note 88, at 845-46 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
180. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782-83 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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Amendment, Mr. Holmes protested:
What gives an additional glare of horror to these
gloomy circumstances is the consideration that
Congress have to ascertain, point out, and
determine, what kind of punishments shall be
inflicted on persons convicted of crimes. They
are nowhere restrained from inventing the most
cruel and unheard-of punishments, and annexing
them to crimes; and there is no constitutional
check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be
amongst the most mild instruments of their
discipline.181
Holmes‘s view, therefore, was that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause imposed a restraint on Congress‘s right to
create punishments for federal crimes. The concern was also
about legislative power, since the new government created by
the Constitution precluded, through a prohibition on the bill of
attainder and other procedural protections, convictions and
punishments by Executive fiat. On the other front, Livermore
―favored rejection of the [A]mendment because of his fear of
what later generations might make of it.‖182 However, even
though elasticity means both enhancement and retrenchment
of protections, I have explained why in constitutional terms the
latter is usually unacceptable. Indeed, the Livermore view
suggesting rejection did not prevail, but of course the second
prong of the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis asks
whether less drastic punitive alternatives are available. Apart
from this, certain categorical prohibitions are also observed in
the natural course of evolving societal standards.183 The
Framers‘ prohibition on ―torturous punishments‖ does not
demand the inference that only such punishments were
outlawed by the Clause; it does, however, demand the inference
181. 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888).
182. Heffernan, supra note 74, at 1390.
183. See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw:
Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 278 (2003); Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to the
Lost Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 661, 666-680 (2004).
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that torture per se was outlawed by the Clause. The fear that
the legislature would have unlimited power to prescribe
punishments was stated by Patrick Henry at the Virginia
convention for ratification of the Eighth Amendment:
Congress, from their general powers, may fully
go into business of human legislation. They may
legislate, in criminal cases, from treason to the
lowest offence — petty larceny. They may define
crimes and prescribe punishments.
In the
definition of crimes, I trust they will be directed
by what wise representatives ought to be
governed by. But when we come to punishments,
no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put
on the virtue of representatives. What says our
[Virginia] bill of rights? — ―that excessive bail
ought not to be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.‖ Are you not, therefore, now calling on
those gentlemen who are to compose Congress, to
. . . define punishments without this control?
Will they find sentiments there similar to this
bill of rights? You let them loose; you do more —
you depart from the genius of your country. . . .
....
In this business of legislation, your members
of Congress will loose the restriction of not
imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive
bail, and inflicting cruel and unusual
punishments. These are prohibited by your
[Virginia] declaration of rights.
What has
distinguished our ancestors? — That they would
not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous
punishment.184
Henry then added:
But Congress may introduce the practice of the
184. 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 447 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/19

44

588

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

civil law, in preference to that of the common
law. They may introduce the practice of France,
Spain, and Germany — of torturing, to extort a
confession of the crime.185
Echoing the earlier point about the privilege against selfincrimination working in tandem with the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause,
Mr. George Mason [of Virginia] replied that the
worthy gentleman was mistaken in his assertion
that the bill of rights did not prohibit torture; for
that one clause expressly provided that no man
can give evidence against himself . . . . Another
clause of the bill of rights provided that no cruel
and unusual punishments shall be inflicted;
therefore, torture was included in the
prohibition.186
The Eighth Amendment, of course, would be applied to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Starting with the
First Principles, irrespective of whether the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause is applied to the States through the Due
Process or the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the effect is the same. Congressman
Henry H. Bingham, when proposing the Fourteenth
Amendment, maintained that ―the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States,‖ as protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, included protection against ―cruel and unusual
punishments‖:
[M]any instances of State injustice and
oppression have already occurred in the State
legislation of this Union, of flagrant violations of
the guarantied privileges of citizens of the
United States, for which the national
Government furnished and could furnish by law
no remedy whatever. Contrary to the express
185. Id. at 447-48.
186. Id. at 452.
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letter of your Constitution, ―cruel and unusual
punishments‖ have been inflicted under State
laws within this Union upon citizens, not only for
crimes committed, but for sacred duty done, for
which and against which the Government of the
United States had provided no remedy and could
provide none.187
We now arrive at the issue of equal protection of the laws
in the national security setting. What of the difference in
treatment between citizens and non-citizens?
The
Constitution, according to text or history, does not seem to
permit a lesser degree of scrutiny for torture upon noncitizens.188 ―Under the Business as Usual model of emergency
powers, a state of emergency does not justify a deviation from
the ‗normal‘ legal system.‖189 To date, the Supreme Court has
approved of distinctions between citizens and non-citizens that
bear a stronger affinity to matters of government jobs and
other privileges as opposed to matters of right. Such privileges
are few and far between and the government may reasonably
prefer citizens over non-citizens in some cases.190 But these
privileges are worlds-apart from criminal law questions so
central to an individual‘s life, liberty and dignity. Here
―selective and targeted infliction of punishments as serious as
those dispensed by a criminal trial upon [those] without
political potency (exercised through the franchise) registers
equal-protection concerns.‖191
Boumediene v. Bush192 and
187. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866).
188. See generally Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1071 (L. Levy & K. Karst eds., 1986).
189. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises
Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1043 (2003).
190. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 n.22 (1976)
(non-citizens as a ―class . . . suffer special disabilities‖); Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634 (1973) (government may not restrict ordinary civil servant jobs
to citizens); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (state may not exclude
persons from law practice just because they are non-citizens); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (―[C]lassifications based on alienage . . .
are . . . subject to close judicial scrutiny.‖). See also Michael C. Dorf, Equal
Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951 (2002).
191. Dasgupta, supra note 56, at 444. See also id. at 445 (―It is difficult
to reconcile the Constitution‘s equality instruction as the ‗salvation‘ against
inequities with . . . weak enforcement of that constitutional guarantee
(especially when the group singled out for unique treatment (in this case
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Guantanamo Bay do not provide the only context in which
habeas corpus has been suspended in this country.193 However,
this recent scenario has breathtaking dimensions because of
the citizen-noncitizen distinction, mirroring in many respects
the Japanese internment during World War II (based on
ancestry and race). Like the Israeli Supreme Court‘s Morcos
decision insisting on equality for gas mask distribution,
American courts, during the current War on Terror (and
presumably we define the ―War on Terror‖ that broadly), must
not stop policing the protection of individuals‘ rights.
Sovereigns have a duty to govern impartially and
neutrally, in observance of Justice Coke‘s centuries-old
admonition to King James I that ―quod Rex non debet esse sub
homine, sed sub Deo et lege.‖194 The word ―neutrality‖ has
widely been used by the United States Supreme Court to
describe the role of the government in such situations. In
Romer v. Evans, the Court spoke of the government‘s
constitutional ―[pre-]commitment to the law‘s neutrality where
foreigners) lacks even the political agency to make waves electorally). If
legislative changes cannot be made by the aggrieved group through
democratic means, then the doctrinal foundation of the judicial restraint
philosophy suffers a setback.‖). Even though we do not live in a system of
parliamentary supremacy and instead in a regime where a written
constitution allows the judiciary to question the legality of the actions of both
the executive and the legislature, Congress has shown itself amenable to
respecting the human dignity of persons in many cases. See, e.g., Ledbetter
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), overruled by statute,
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5; Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), overruled, in part, by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality); 1 BARBARA
LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 2 (3d ed.
1996) (―A spate of Court decisions in the late 1980s drew congressional fire
and resulted in demands for legislative change [culminating in the 1991 Civil
Rights Act].‖ (footnote omitted)).
192. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
193. See, e.g., Justia.com, U.S. Supreme Court Center, http://supreme.
justia.com/constitution/article-1/51-habeas-corpus-suspension.html
(last
visited Nov. 24, 2009) (―The privilege of the Writ was suspended in nine
counties in South Carolina in order to combat the Ku Klux Klan, pursuant to
Act of April 20, 1871, 4, 17 Stat. 14. It was suspended in the Philippines in
1905, pursuant to the Act of July 1, 1902, 5, 32 Stat. 692. Finally, it was
suspended in Hawaii during World War II, pursuant to a section of the
Hawaiian Organic Act, 67, 31 Stat. 153 (1900).‖ (citations omitted)).
194. Latin for ―the king is not subject to man, but subject to God and the
law.‖
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the rights of persons are at stake.‖195 This echoed Justice
Stevens‘ earlier assertion, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, that constitutional constraints on government
conduct ―include[d] elements of legitimacy and neutrality that
must always characterize the performance of the sovereign‘s
duty to govern impartially.‖196 Invalidating a private litigant‘s
use of gender in a peremptory challenge and holding it to a
presumptively unconstitutional criterion, Justice Kennedy, in
J.E.B. v. Alabama, also invoked the same word.197 Alienage or
non-citizen status may well have to be used as a distinguishing
factor, but never as a pretext or without an ―exceedingly
persuasive justification.‖198
Even if the Court cannot or is unprepared to apply de facto
strict scrutiny to such classifications, the Court should
expressly remove them from rational basis-land. If not strict
scrutiny, then some form of heightened scrutiny is necessary.
Under existing case law, the deprivation of constitutional
rights in criminal or detention law (including the freedom from
torture) would be tantamount to fencing out of the judicial
process those who already are excluded from the political
process (at least through suffrage). Setting up a lenient torture
warrant procedure or allowing torture altogether for noncitizens would penalize ―millions of green card holders and five
billion people across the planet‖ and slot them ―into a category
that enables a different, and far inferior . . . procedure than
what American citizens face.‖199 Torture is not a situation
where differential treatment based on alienage qualifies as a
―plausible reason[ ],‖200 at least not a constitutionally justifiable
195. 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
196. 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
197. 511 U.S. 127, 153 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
198. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (quoting Miss.
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
199. Neal Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1365,
1367 (2007) (in these circumstances, ―standard checks on government abuse,
such as political accountability, fail to operate‖). See also JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 161-62 (1980);
Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court: 1990 Term — Foreword:
Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the BorkBrennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 92-93 (1991).
200. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). See also
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (―The Constitution presumes that,
absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will
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one.
Irrespective of what constitutes ―torture‖ and how sound
that definition might be, it only means something if the right to
be free from torture can be vindicated in court. Therefore, the
right not to be tortured shares an important connection with
habeas corpus itself. Under the Constitution, an individual‘s
right to ―the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety‖ so requires.201 Without habeas corpus, the government
has no obligation, and the accused no right, to have the facts
tried in court. In the history of habeas corpus, we first
encounter the infamous Darnel‟s Case in Stuart England.202
That dispute arose from King Charles I‘s decision to issue a
warrant to arrest those who refused to become his creditors.
Public disapproval rising, the House of Commons rapidly
enacted
the
Petition
of
Right,203
reproving
such
―imprison[ment] without any cause,‖ and proclaimed that ―no
freeman in any such manner as is before mencioned [shall] be
imprisoned or deteined.‖204 Later, the Habeas Corpus Acts of
1640 and 1679 provided individuals a right to have their
imprisonment (through the order or warrant of the Privy
Council or the monarch herself) questioned by an impartial
court. After the tense period of interregnum, Parliament
stipulated procedures governing access to habeas relief.205 It is
fair to say that ―[a]t its historical core, the writ of habeas
eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think
a political branch has acted.‖ (footnote omitted)).
201. U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl. 2.
202. Darnel‘s Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 1 (K.B. 1627).
203. See 3 Car. 1, c. 1 (1627) (Eng.), reprinted in 5 STATUTES OF THE
REALM 23-24 (1810).
204. Id. at 24.
205. This Act, which William Blackstone later considered the ―second
magna carta, and stable bulwark of our liberties,‖ served as the paradigm for
the habeas laws of the original thirteen American colonies. See
WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 137 (Adamant Media,
2000). See also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *137; Rex A. Collings,
Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts — Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace,
40 CAL. L. REV. 335, 338-39 (1952). Moreover, THE FEDERALIST No. 84
(Alexander Hamilton), explained the writ of habeas corpus, the only common
law writ appearing in the United States Constitution, as ―the practice of
arbitrary imprisonments‖ and ―in all ages, the favorite and most formidable
instruments of tyranny.‖
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corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of
executive detention, and it is in that context that its
protections have been strongest.‖206
Remarkably, the New York state convention considering
the ratification of the Constitution in July 1788 noted:
[E]very Person restrained of his Liberty is
entitled to an enquiry into the lawfulness of such
restraint, and to a removal thereof if unlawful;
and that such enquiry or removal ought not to be
denied or delayed, except when, on account of
Public Danger, the Congress shall suspend the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.207
Notice the choice in diction. ―The word ‗person,‘ as opposed to
the more limiting term ‗citizen,‘ informs the universal
character of the privilege, irrespective of the [tortured or
interrogated person‘s] citizenship status.‖208 What else can we
infer? Perhaps we can infer that the reasoning behind the
otherwise-salutary theory of judicial restraint falls apart when
the group singled out for a disfavor lacks the political
wherewithal to hold accountable those legislators and that
President whom they could not oust through elections because
they had no suffrage in our polity.
Textually, too, the
Constitution does not favor such distinctions. The adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause
extended to state action a requirement that the government
may not arbitrarily discriminate against some persons in
preference to others; this obligation had already been imposed
upon the Federal Government through the Fifth Amendment‘s
Due Process Clause. Justice Robert H. Jackson advanced a
theory of judicial review whose fons et origo was the
government‘s (and associatively, society‘s) enforcement of
equality: ―Courts can take no better measure to assure that
laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in
206. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
207. Resolution of the New York Ratifying Convention (July 26, 1788),
reprinted in 1 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 328 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888)
(emphasis added).
208. Dasgupta, supra note 56, at 444.
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operation.‖209
The argument runs that the political process will not allow
(or will respond with a backlash to) arbitrary, capricious and
generally
undesirable
inconveniences
when
those
inconveniences are distributed evenly throughout society. No
one or two groups will disproportionately suffer. As Professor
Louis Henkin points out, ―[t]he choice in the Bill of Rights of
the word ‗person‘ rather than ‗citizen‘ was not fortuitous; nor
was the absence of a geographical limitation. [It] reflect[s] a
commitment to respect the individual rights of all human
The
beings.‖210 Same with the Fourteenth Amendment.
Amendment was initially drafted to forbid state action
discriminating between ―persons because of race, color or
previous condition of servitude[,]‖ and instead, it went on to
prohibit, in sweeping terms, such discrimination against ―any
person within its jurisdiction.‖211 Henkin‘s view, publicly
endorsed by at least one Member of the present Supreme
Court, is that ―[w]herever the United States acts, it can only
act in accordance with the limitations imposed by the
Constitution.‖212
In the field of national security, where courts give the
political Branches the most deference, even the war power is

209. Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (―[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty
against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be
imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so
effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom
they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that
might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.‖).
210. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 139 (1990). This phrase ―the
People‖ has repeatedly been used in the Constitution‘s text as conceptually
different from the phrase ―persons.‖ The former refers to the polity and the
citizenry, in whose name the governments, both of the United States and of
the several states, exist. ―Persons‖ refers to individuals whose rights are
protected and defended by some parts of the original Constitution, most of
the Bill of Rights, and several of the Amendments.
211. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 151 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment) (citations omitted). Of course, it is the Fifth
Amendment and not the Fourteenth that limits the reach of federal official
action. Nevertheless, the inference is noteworthy because the Fourteenth
Amendment was modeled upon and incorporated the Bill of Rights.
212. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Tribute to Louis Henkin, 38 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 467, 468 (2007).
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governed by ―applicable constitutional limitations.‖213 ―[I]n
times of war or of perceived threats from abroad, civil liberties
have been compromised by actions of the Congress or the
president that were upheld by the courts.‖214 The Framers
were brave and visionary statesmen, and they outright forbade
torture—indeed it is clear that even if they could not define
what a ―cruel and unusual punishment‖ might necessarily look
like, they did typify torture as such. However, their challenges
were not of a nuclear-scale, as they are now, so ending the
constitutional inquiry there would be extrapolating history out
of context.215 This should not provide license to silence our
supreme domestic laws and international jus cogens; rather, it
should be an invitation to work within the laws.216
III. Why Qualified Immunity (Ironically) Helps the ‗Torture
Warrant‘ Argument
Even if we review an incident of torture after-the-fact with
213. Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156
(1919).
214. Morton H. Halperin, National Security, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS
281 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1984).
215. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, First Conference on Computers,
Freedom & Privacy: The Constitution in Cyperspace (Mar. 26, 1991) (preconference
paper
available
at
http://cpsr.org/prevsite/conferences/cfp91/tribe2.html/) (stating that ―the
Framers of our Constitution were . . . profoundly wise. They bequeathed us a
framework for all seasons, a truly astonishing document whose basic
principles . . . are suitable for all times and all technological landscapes‖).
216. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME SILENCE DURING WAR, at 1-2
n.4 (2004), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p83449_index.html; HCJ 168/91
Morcos v. Minister of Def. [1991] IsrSC 45(1) 467, 470-71 (―When the cannons
speak, the Muses are silent. But even when the cannons speak, the military
commander must uphold the law. The power of society to stand up against
its enemies is based on its recognition that it is fighting for values that
deserve protection. The rule of law is one of these values.‖); HCJ 428/86
Barzilai v. Gov‘t of Israel [1986] IsrLR 140 (―[F]or there is no security without
law, and the rule of law is a component of national security. Security needs
dictate that the proper investigative machinery be found, or else the General
Security Service will be unable to fulfill its task. The strength of the Service
lies in the public confidence it enjoys, in the trust placed in it by the court. If
security interests become the paramount consideration, the public as well as
the court will lose their trust in the Security Service and in the legality of its
operations. Without trust, the State authorities cannot function. That is the
case with the public trust in the courts, and so it is with the public trust in
the other governmental organs.‖ (citation omitted)).
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tremendous deference to the instantaneous decision that had to
be made, purely invidious criteria, such as unconstitutional
discrimination or disparate impact (conscious or not), could
well have injected themselves into the torturer‘s decision. The
standard for qualified immunity has gradually been bent so
favorably towards the government officials allegedly causing
constitutional violations, and has put such an extraordinary
burden on plaintiffs, that it no longer works in most situations.
That is to say that qualified immunity is almost always
granted, and therefore, it has stopped serving as a post-hoc
deterrent.
In effect, the current frequency of qualified
immunity approval (by the Supreme Court to government
officers accused of violating persons‘ legal rights) compels us to
think of more workable alternatives to control how often and
how inaccurately torture is imposed in ticking-bomb scenarios.
Torture warrants remain a feasible pre-trial and
preventive interrogation alternative. A recent example should
be illustrative. The United States Supreme Court‘s Ashcroft v.
Iqbal217 decision has received less coverage (both in the media
and scholarship) than it should be receiving. Iqbal and its
precursors render it likely that officials accused of torturing or
otherwise violating the constitutional rights of those detainees
who were rounded up immediately after September 11, 2001,
will enjoy qualified immunity. The facts and claims addressed
in Iqbal are notable.218 Because the detainees were primarily
217. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
218. The Iqbal Court noted:
The complaint contends that petitioners designated
respondent a person of high interest on account of his race,
religion, or national origin, in contravention of the First and
Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. The complaint
alleges that ―the [FBI], under the direction of Defendant
Mueller [then-Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)], arrested and detained thousands of
Arab Muslim men . . . as part of its investigation of the
events of September 11.‖ It further alleges that ―[t]he policy
of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly
restrictive conditions of confinement until they were
‗cleared‘ by the FBI was approved by Defendants Ashcroft
[then-Attorney General of the United States] and Mueller in
discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.‖ Lastly,
the complaint posits that petitioners ―each knew of,
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject‖
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Arabs and Muslims, discrimination claims were included. The
governing statutory provision is Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires that a complaint must
contain a ―short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.‖ The law‘s ―constitutive
principle[s]‖ are that the rules must, at a minimum, be
transformative, accountable, and prospective.219 Because Rule
8 states an implied cause of action (unquestionably raising
important ―separation of powers concerns‖),220 it is presumed to
be a ―federal analog to suits brought against state officials
under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.S.C. §1983.‖221
Despite the due process arguments involving Mathews,
Sandin, and Wilkinson (recited in Part I), the Iqbal Court
raised the standard of pleading so high that it may be arguably
insurmountable in cases involving similar torture scenarios.
Iqbal thus makes clear that officials will, more likely than not,
receive the benefit of the doubt and thus receive qualified
immunity. Rule 8, the Court said, ―does not require ‗detailed
factual allegations,‘ but it demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.‖222
Such
specific evidence is hard to come by in situations where a
torturee does not know the names of the perpetrators;
sometimes all a plaintiff will know is the supervisor‘s name
and identity. Raising the Rule 8 threshold so high effectively
respondent to harsh conditions of confinement ―as a matter
of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or
national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.‖
The pleading names Ashcroft as the ―principal architect‖ of
the policy, and identifies Mueller as ―instrumental in [its]
adoption, promulgation, and implementation.‖
Id. at 1944 (citations omitted).
219. See LUC B. TREMBLAY, THE RULE OF LAW, JUSTICE, AND
INTERPRETATION 150-55 (1997).
220. See, e.g., Ryan D. Newman, From Bivens to Malesko and Beyond:
Implied Constitutional Remedies and the Separation of Powers, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 471, 473 (2006).
221. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254-55 n.2 (2006). See also
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
222. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (―A pleading that offers ‗labels and
conclusions‘ or ‗a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.‘ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked ‗assertion[s]‘ devoid
of further factual enhancement.‖ (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007))).
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bars these cases from federal court.
Notwithstanding Rule 8‘s prescription that a plaintiff‘s
factual allegations must be taken to be true, Iqbal rejected the
plaintiff‘s allegations that the government defendants ―agreed
to subject him to harsh conditions as a matter of policy, solely
on account of discriminatory factors and for no legitimate
penological interest; that [the then-Attorney General of the
United States] was that policy‘s ‗principal architect‘; and that
[the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)] was
‗instrumental‘ in its adoption and execution . . . .‖223 Such a
standard makes it likelier that the torturer will employ torture
whenever she has some doubt, and it gives fruition to the
prophecy that the government ―might come to rely on torture to
avert attacks‖: ―legalizing torture in high evidence cases can
reduce security and increase agency incentives to torture even
in low evidence cases, leading to a ‗slippery slope.‘‖224
A. Applying Qualified Immunity
The pivotal Supreme Court decision Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics225 held
that implied causes of action exist to protect against federal
officials‘ violations of the Fourth Amendment (protecting
against unreasonable searches and seizures).226
Bivens
―recognized for the first time an implied private action for
damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a
citizen‘s constitutional rights.‖227 As an implied cause of
action, Bivens has been the target of enormous criticism (for
allegedly anti-democratic judicial law-making).228 Individuals
223. Id. at 1941.
224. Hugo M. Mialon, Sue H. Mialon & Maxwell B. Stinchcombe, An
Economic Analysis of Torture in Counterterrorism 1 (Dec. 12, 2008)
(unpublished article), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1268441.
225. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
226. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234 (1979) (holding that a
congressional employee may bring a Bivens action against a former
congressman for a Fifth Amendment violation); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14, 19-20 (1980) (holding that a deceased federal prisoner may be entitled to
a Bivens action under the Eighth Amendment).
227. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001).
228. See, e.g., Carlson, 446 U.S. at 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (―In my
view, it is ‗an exercise of power that the Constitution does not give us‘ for this
Court to infer a private civil damages remedy from the Eighth Amendment or
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victimized by the denial of this right may sue for the infraction
of the Fourth Amendment itself, despite the absence of any
federal statute expressly authorizing such a suit.229
The presumption was that an automatic remedy for the
violation derives from the history and magnitude of the right
violated, and that the cause of action fails to attach only when
Congress disabuses the courts from applying such a remedy.230
Here the default understanding is in favor of a federal law
remedy since constitutional
abuses
require
special
enforcement, which is not necessarily appropriate for violations
of federal positive law. In Saucier v. Katz,231 and other cases,
however, the Court has qualified Bivens by using the vehicle of
qualified immunity.232 The qualified immunity doctrine states
that if the government defendant violated a constitutional right
any other constitutional provision.‖ (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 428 (Black,
J., dissenting))).
We would more surely preserve the important values of the
doctrine of separation of powers — and perhaps get a better
result — by recommending a solution to the Congress as the
branch of government in which the Constitution has vested
the legislative power. Legislation is the business of the
Congress, and it has the facilities and competence for that
task — as we do not.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
229. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
230. See id. at 396-97. Some scholars would openly truncate Congress‘
right to limit the causes of action, and they therefore do not bemoan the lack
of Congress‘ express validation. However, that step would be precipitous and
would amount to cutting off a budding dialogue with a coordinate branch.
See, e.g., George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs –
Have the Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263, 294-95 (1989)
(asserting that because Bivens protects constitutional rights, less deference to
Congress is required than in other cases); Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and
Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1540-43
(1972) (analogizing federal statutes with the Constitution and arguing that
courts should infer remedies constitutionally as they do statutorily); Gene R.
Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV.
1117, 1153 (1989) (recognizing implied constitutional remedies as an
essential aspect of federal judicial oversight); Joan Steinman, Backing Off
Bivens and the Ramifications of this Retreat for the Vindication of First
Amendment Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 269, 297-302 (1984) (arguing that
Bivens remedies should also apply to the First Amendment).
231. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
232. See, e.g., id.; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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that was not clearly established when the right was violated,
then the official remains immune from suit.233 The qualified
immunity defense is synonymous with the Model Penal Code‘s
necessity defense.234 This is the background of the post-torture
scenario.
The pre-torture configuration, however, goes to the merit
of a torture warrant: it might actually aid the suspect.
Requiring the government to receive a torture warrant from a
judge will ensure that the suspect retains some realistic chance
of averting torture in the face of Executive fiat. An impartial
arbiter, better situated in the moment, with 20-20 vision of the
situation, is more capable of assessing the imminent need for
torture than is the actual torturer. The deference I propose is a
hybrid of Fourth Amendment search and seizure principles and
the qualified immunity decisional law governing official
conduct in hindsight. Qualified immunity, to be prospective
and fair to the parties, requires: (1) that the reviewing
standard be de novo and the reviewing court consider a district
court‘s rejection of qualified immunity if the question turns on
a legal point; (2) that a constitutional violation subject to
Bivens federal actions be a matter of clearly established law;
(3) that the personal involvement of the defendants be alleged
and proven; and (4) that the pleading standard be such that a
complaint ―give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the

233. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01. Such cases include torture, discrete
acts of discrimination, and other government behavior forbidden by the
Constitution. Bivens is federal common law; Congress has not eviscerated its
central holding. See, e.g., Riddhi Dasgupta, Bivens in the War on Terror:
Scope for the Supreme Court in its Upcoming Case, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV.
397, 411-12 (2009) (―The Supreme Court deconstructed the qualified
immunity inquiry into two parts: first, to determine whether the facts
indicate and prove that a government defendant violated another‘s
constitutional rights; and second, if indeed the defendant did do so, then was
the constitutional right thus violated ‗clearly established‘ at the time of the
government official‘s infraction? . . . [T]he dilemma lies on the prongs of an
ex ante versus ex post judicial inquiry over whether the defendant is entitled
to qualified immunity.‖ (citation omitted)); Jon O. Newman, Suing the
Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for
Law Enforcers‟ Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 460 (1978). Absent legislation
by Congress, the Court weighs statutory stare decisis heavily.
234. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02. See also Goldberg, supra note 37, at 17
(―The Model Code rejects any limitations on necessity cast in terms of
particular evils to be avoided or particular evils to be justified.‖).
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plaintiff‘s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.‖235
The hurdle a court must clear before reaching the merits is
the pleading standard.236 Constitutional rights violations are
not the only context where pleading standards are used as a
procedural roadblock.237 Prior cases require litigants to satisfy
the ―notice‖ pleading requirements, providing fair and
adequate notice to their opponents regarding the claim and its
supporting grounds.238 Rule 8 requires that the complaint
―contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under
some viable legal theory.‖239 And even though courts must
―give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to
be drawn from well-pleaded facts,‖240 they are not required to
accept as true conclusory allegations, legal characterizations,
unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact.241
235. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The court ―must take all the well
pleaded allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.‖ Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 665
(3d Cir. 1988) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (referring to
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
236. In an earlier article previewing Ashcroft v. Iqbal‘s deliberation in
the Supreme Court, I predicted: ―Even though this article does not delve
significantly into the issue of pleading standards that may be the frontier
where the battle for qualified immunity is decided. Allowing the case to go
through those gates, or cutting off its movement, might make all the
difference.‖ Dasgupta, supra note 233, at 418. While accepting that Iqbal‘s
First Amendment claims might be meritorious, by raising the pleadings
standards the Court gave the high-ranking officials immunity from monetary
damages.
237. Securities law is another such context. See Dura Pharm. v. Broudo,
544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (―[O]rdinary pleading rules are not meant to impose
a great burden on a plaintiff. But it should not prove burdensome for a
plaintiff who has suffered an economic loss to provide a defendant with some
indication of the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind.
. . . [A]llowing a plaintiff to forgo giving any indication of the economic loss
and proximate cause would bring about harm of the very sort the statutes
seek to avoid.‖) (citations omitted)).
238. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512; Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
239. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106
(7th Cir. 1984)). Courts of Appeals have applied this test with some success.
See, e.g., Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006); Snow
v. Directv, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
240. Tyler v. Cisneros, 136 F.3d 603, 607 (9th Cir. 1998).
241. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.
2001).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/19

58

602

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

All of these pleading requirements are on top of the fact that
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already
provides for pretrial procedures to bar frivolous or other
patently unmeritorious and vexatious claims.242
It follows that a heightened pleading standard might doom
the torturee‘s money damages suit: due to the unusual
circumstances and lack of specific knowledge during his prison
confinement, his allegations do not decisively pinpoint when
the alleged conduct took place, who the actors were, or what
the locations were.243 Especially when, as in Bivens, no
criminal charges have been filed, a torturee has no remedy to
recover other than money damages. In Iqbal, although the
defendant was convicted of criminal charges, there is no other
remedy for the plaintiff to pursue other than damages in a
Bivens action—nothing else can make him whole or
compensate him for the alleged violations of his constitutional
rights (namely, the First and Fifth Amendments).
The
government-defendants would prefer a high pleading
threshold, which would likely keep the merits of the case out of
federal court (due to Twombly, or Iqbal itself). The torturee‘s
allegations would likely be found insufficiently detailed.
Sometimes, federal courts of appeal ―review the district court‘s
denial de novo, accepting as true the material facts alleged in
the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in
plaintiffs‘ favor.‖244 This civil procedure rule is germane when
242. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 593 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―Rule
16 invests a trial judge with the power, backed by sanctions, to regulate
pretrial proceedings via conferences and scheduling orders, at which the
parties may discuss, inter alia, ‗the elimination of frivolous claims or
defenses,‘ Rule 16(c)(1); ‗the necessity or desirability of amendments to the
pleadings,‘ Rule 16(c)(2); ‗the control and scheduling of discovery,‘ Rule
16(c)(6); and ‗the need for adopting special procedures for managing
potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues,
multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems,‘ Rule
16(c)(12).‖).
243. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the
Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 924-26 (2009) (identifying
various forms of information asymmetry with respect to costs and facts—
including ―informed plaintiffs and uninformed defendants‖ and ―uninformed
plaintiffs and informed defendants‖—as a primary cause of meritless suits;
regulatory responses and gatekeeping rules must be calibrated, and, if
necessary, recalibrated, to measure up to the task).
244. Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 250 (2d
Cir. 2001).
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a district court rejects a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the
suit and denies a qualified immunity motion.
Supreme Court precedent, viz. Mitchell v. Forsyth,
provides that when a federal district court denies a motion for
qualified immunity, ―to the extent that it turns on an issue of
law,‖ its judgment is ―an appealable ‗final decision.‘‖245
Mitchell expressed the flip side to the plaintiff‘s argument that
she should be made whole after her suffering: specifically, the
government defendants‘ defense is that they were following the
law as it existed at the time and which they had had no goodfaith reason to believe would change in the middle of the game.
Since qualified immunity, much like absolute immunity, is
after all a right not to stand trial, such a right of the officers is
violated if a false-start case goes to trial incorrectly.246 Courts
have held that ―[q]ualified immunity is an immunity from suit
and not just a defense to liability.‖247 Thus, a decision
prejudicing this right might be reversed or vacated on an
interlocutory appeal.248 The federal statutory provision, 28
U.S.C. § 1291, does not require the case to come to an end or for
a ―final judgment‖ to be entered such that the district court‘s
denial of qualified immunity can be reviewed on appeal.249 As
soon as a federal district court finds that a plaintiff‘s factual
allegations are true, a reviewing court is empowered to
determine if the facts point towards allegedly unconstitutional
conduct and infringe upon a right clearly established at the
time of the violation.
In Johnson v. Jones, the Supreme Court ruled that
interlocutory appeals raising qualified immunity as a defense
are permitted to the extent that they seek review of legal, as
opposed to factual, questions.250
Facts are within the
jurisdiction of the court of original jurisdiction, and a very high
burden must be met before factual conclusions are reversed.
Johnson thus restricted the effect of Anderson v. Creighton,
which provided that plaintiffs must demonstrate some factual
similarities between constitutional holdings and officers‘
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000)).
Id. at 526 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982)).
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 152 (2d. Cir. 2007).
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528-29.
Id. at 530.
515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995).
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alleged violations.251 Similarly, the Court in Hope v. Pelzer
refused to hold that unconstitutional government acts must be
―materially similar‖ to acts that already have been held
Were the Court to fashion such a
unconstitutional.252
gerrymandered rule, officers might have the perverse incentive
to purposefully avoid that specific violation but few others.
―While Bivens . . . enables pecuniary damages suits to be
brought against federal officials for their alleged
unconstitutional acts, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 enables the same to be
The Supreme Court‘s
brought against state officials.‖253
qualified immunity jurisprudence does not clear out the
―tension between the Court‘s objective that constitutional tort
cases be terminated at an early stage of litigation and the
‗inherently fact-based nature of the reasonableness inquiry
that lies at the heart of the qualified immunity‘s analytical
framework.‘‖254
Qualified immunity, as it stands now, is available to
federal and state officials commissioned with discretionary
functions in cases where their conduct did not violate ―clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights.‖255 As this logic
goes, these officials had no forewarning that what they were
doing to the individual skated close to a constitutional
limitation or even went beyond it.256 The Mitchell Court
refused to grant absolute immunity to cabinet officials,
deciding that ―the considerations of separation of powers that
call for absolute immunity for state and federal legislators and
for the President of the United States do not demand a similar
immunity for Cabinet officers or other high executive

251. 483 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1987).
252. 536 U.S. 730, 746 (2002).
253. Dasgupta, supra note 233, 409-10.
254. Id. at 410 (quoting Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified
Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 230-31 (2006)). See Flatford v. City of Monroe,
17 F.3d 162, 166 (6th Cir. 1994) (―[T]he difficulty for all judges with qualified
immunity has not been articulation of the rule, but rather the application of
it.‖); Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments
in the Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447-48
(2000).
255. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). See also Procunier
v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978) (requiring a ―clearly established‖
constitutional right to defeat the qualified immunity defense).
256. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2007).
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officials.‖257 Even if the plaintiff‘s rights were violated under
clearly established law, there remains a not-very-remote
possibility that the officer might still receive qualified
immunity. The Supreme Court has been developing this aspect
of the qualified immunity doctrine for the past three decades
and it does not yet appear that the Court has completed its
project.
In 1982, for instance, the Court dramatically supplanted
the ―malice‖ standard (the government actor‘s state of mind
while violating the constitutional rights) with the ―reasonable
person‖ test (assessing whether a reasonable officer would have
understood her conduct to be a constitutional violation, as the
law stood).258 The Saucier Court asked if ―it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted.‖259 Other than the most obvious cases,
there is great room for subjectivity here: Who is a ―reasonable‖
officer? What are the elements of the ―clearly established‖
state of the law? Must that ―reasonable‖ government actor
have revealed her prior knowledge on the subject? If that is
the standard we apply, then would officers be constrained to
avoid certifications or promotions lest they reveal too much
awareness of complex subject matters that could later deprive
them of qualified immunity?260
This ―reasonableness‖ does not depend on ―what a lawyer

257. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 521 (1985).
258. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18. See also Lisa R. Eskow & Kevin W.
Cole, The Unqualified Paradoxes of Qualified Immunity: Reasonably
Mistaken Beliefs, Reasonably Unreasonable Conduct, and the Specter of
Subjective Intent that Haunts Objective Legal Reasonableness, 50 BAYLOR L.
REV. 869, 881-88 (1998); Newman, supra note 233, at 460 (―Surely [an] officer
could not reasonably believe that there was probable cause for an unlawful
arrest, for an unlawful arrest is by definition an arrest for which a prudent
police officer could not reasonably believe there was probable cause.‖
(emphasis in original)).
259. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
260. The issue of racial profiling was once again brought to national
attention when a police officer arrested Harvard University professor Henry
Louis Gates, Jr., an African-American man, while the professor was entering
his own home through the back door. See Kevin Johnson, Alan Gomez, &
Marisol Bello, Gates Arrest Reignites Debate on Race, USA TODAY, July 23,
2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-07-23-copgates_N.htm (reporting that arresting officer is ―a police academy instructor
on the dangers of racial profiling‖).
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would learn or intuit from researching case law.‖261 In its
place, ―the standard to measure liability has shifted from
malice to assumption of expected prior knowledge, both of
which are indecipherable elements of scienter, especially in
close cases.‖262 The courts should make it crystal clear,
however, that the defense is available for government officers
only when none of the ―reasonable inferences,‖263 including
those that are implied or deduced logically from prior decisions,
suggest that a plaintiff‘s claims cannot survive the two-part
qualified immunity test.
Without the defendant‘s personal involvement, though, she
cannot be held liable. Supervisory liability is not, according to
Iqbal, cognizable264—even though Justice Souter‘s dissenting
opinion efficaciously pointed out that a claim would be
actionable where government supervisors have ―actual
knowledge of a subordinate‘s constitutional violation and
acquiesce[ ];‖265 where they ―know about the conduct and
facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear
of what they might see;‖266 ―where the supervisor was grossly
negligent;‖267 or ―where the supervisor has no actual knowledge
of the violation but was reckless in his supervision of the
subordinate.‖268 Justice Souter believed that the Iqbal Court
discarded, not merely limited, the possibility of supervisory
liability.269
261. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 152 (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson v.
Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2001))
262. Dasgupta, supra note 233, at 412 (emphasis added).
263. See Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 153 (quoting Johnson, 239 F.3d at 255).
264. The Court cited cases to that effect. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep‘t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978); Dunlop v. Munroe, 11 U.S. 242 (1812); Robertson v.
Sichel, 127 U.S. 507 (1888)). But the Iqbal Court neglected to note that
judgments of policy made by those supervisors fall squarely within those
―official duties.‖ See Robertson, 127 U.S. at 516.
265. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1958 (Souter, J., dissenting).
266. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Int‘l Action Ctr. v. United
States, 365 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
267. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
268. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
269. Id. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting) (―Lest there be any mistake, in
these words the majority is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it
is eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely.
The nature of a
supervisory liability theory is that the supervisor may be liable, under certain
conditions, for the wrongdoing of his subordinates, and it is this very
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B. Reviewing the Legality of the Torture Warrant
The possibility of a torture warrant would only be put on
the table if there was an extremely high probability that the
torturee possessed valuable information and there was the risk
of an attack of significant proportion, putting innocent lives at
stake. If performing an illegal search upon an individual‘s
person is presumptively unconstitutional, then so is torture—
unless the actor is informed by a combination of probabilities
that makes it significantly likely (at least more likely than not)
that the torturee is in possession of information that could save
lives and that the torturee will reveal this information under
intense, perhaps searing, physical or mental pain.
The deference later given to judging the constitutionality
of a specific torture warrant is not tantamount to an abdication
of judicial review. Rather, it speaks to the balance that needs
to be struck between genuinely compelling national security
needs and the dignity of individuals, as enshrined in the
Constitution.
Professor Dershowitz‘s torture warrant
mechanism is not perfect but it ―brings the idea of foundational
violence back to the surface‖ and ―seeks to admit the violence
[while] control[ling] it with law.‖270 Dershowitz argues that the
mechanism will pull the problem out into the sunlight and in
fact ―reduce the use of torture to the smallest amount and
degree possible.‖271 But torture secured by a warrant is
superior to its alternatives on both extremes, and as a ―least
drastic means‖ it is narrowly-tailored to suit the compelling
societal interests and to honor the rights of torturees. Applying
the Model Penal Code‘s necessity defense parameters ―suggests
that it would justify torture in the extreme situations and,
importantly, fail to justify it in less extreme situations.‖272 The
elements include: (i) ―[t]he harm to be averted must be
imminent‖; (ii) ―[t]he act charged must have been done to
prevent a significant evil‖; (iii) ―[t]here must be a causal
relationship between the criminal conduct and the harm to be
principle that the majority rejects.‖).
270. John T. Parry, Torture Warrants and the Rule of Law, 71 ALB. L.
REV. 885, 904-05 (2008).
271. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 16, at 141 (emphasis added).
272. Goldberg, supra note 37, at 17.
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averted‖; (iv) ―[t]here must have been no adequate alternative‖;
and (v) ―[t]he harm caused must not have been
disproportionate to the harm avoided.‖273
The mechanism must be enacted by Congress and signed
into law by the President, as opposed to achieved by the
President‘s executive order alone.274 What Congress may
vaguely direct the President to do, the Executive might
transform into actions that Congress could not have envisioned
or will not countenance.275 The most effective way to hold
Congress accountable is to require the Legislature to pass
those specific measures. I appreciate that Justice Jackson‘s
three-part test in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer276
suggests a slightly different view. Justice Jackson is correct
that, with regard to immediacies that the Executive must face,
congressional action is occasionally unnecessary. But if the
problem at issue lingers and Congress says nothing either way,
as time passes the presumption initially favorable to the
President incrementally fades away.
There is a reason that the separation of powers was
thought to protect the ―liberty of the person‖ in a manner such
that the Framers initially ―did not consider a Bill of Rights
273. Id. at 17-18.
274. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (―Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to
seek the authority [for trial by military commission] he believes necessary.
Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Congress, judicial
insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our Nation‘s ability to deal
with danger. To the contrary, that insistence strengthens the Nation‘s ability
to determine — through democratic means — how best to do so.‖).
275. One example, though controversial, is that Congress‘ Joint
Resolution (in the Authorization for the Use of Military Force or the AUMF)
authorized the President to ―use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed or aided‖ the September 11, 2001, al Qaeda terrorist attacks.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001). Were it drafting the measures in the first place, Congress may well
have demanded greater oversight and different measures for actions so
precipitous.
276. 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (―When the
President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or
in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter,
enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.‖).

65

2010]

TICKING-BOMB SCENARIO

609

necessary.‖277 Separation of powers and the authority of
Congress, much like the authority of the Parliament in
common-law England, were expected to guard a citizen‘s
liberty. Both in English history (including the enactments of
the Petition of Right and the Habeas Corpus Acts of 1640 and
1679) and in American history, the Legislature (Parliament or
Congress) has been far more responsive to the preservation of
individual rights than has the Executive.278 Courts, too, have
the duty to protect individual rights guaranteed by the
Constitution in the face of congressional and presidential
In the area of national security, some
overreaching.279
courageous tribunals and jurists have exhibited this trait.280
The Supreme Court‘s recent Guantánamo Bay detention

277. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 at 513, 515 (Alexander Hamilton)
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961) & GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 536-43 (1969)). See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at
301 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (―The accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.‖).
278. See Dasgupta, supra note 56, at 442 (―Even though the Magna
Carta asserted that no person would be unlawfully imprisoned, the lack of an
enforcement provision and absence of a legal process to bridge the gap
between the protections and their fruition exacerbated arbitrary detentions.‖
(citing Magna Carta, art. 39, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 17
(Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959))). ―No free man shall be
taken or imprisoned or dispossessed, or outlawed, or banished, or in any way
destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send upon him, except by the legal
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.‖ Id.
279. See, e.g., Barak, supra note 161, at 149 (―[M]atters of daily life
constantly test judges‘ ability to protect democracy, but judges meet their
supreme test in situations of war and terrorism. The protection of every
individual‘s human rights is a much more formidable duty in times of war
and terrorism than in times of peace and security. . . . As a Justice of the
Israeli Supreme Court, how should I view my role in protecting human rights
given this situation? I must take human rights seriously during times of
both peace and conflict.‖); ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE 46-47 (1968) (―It is the courts — the independent judiciary —
which have, time and again, rebuked the legislatures and executive
authorities when, under stress of war, emergency, or fear of Communism or
revolution, they have sought to suppress the rights of dissenters.‖ (citing Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943))).
280. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651, 664 (6th
Cir. 1971) (noting that ―[i]t is the historic role of the Judiciary to see that in
periods of crisis, when the challenge to constitutional freedoms is the
greatest, the Constitution of the United States remains the supreme law of
our land‖).
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decisions—Rasul v. Bush,281 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,282 Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld,283 and Boumediene v. Bush284—granting the
detainees access to United States courts via statutory and
constitutional habeas corpus uniformly reject presidential
unilateralism where individual rights are concerned.285
Similar to the torture scenario, here too the President‘s Office
of Legal Counsel advised ―that the great weight of legal
authority indicates that a district court could not properly
exercise habeas jurisdiction over an alien detained at
[Guantánamo Bay].‖286
281. 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (exploring statutory habeas corpus applied to
the detainees held at Guantánamo Bay).
282. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that due process of law requires U.S.
citizens at Guantánamo Bay be given some acceptable process to determine
their culpability and punishment before a neutral arbiter).
283. 548 U.S. 557, 706 (2006) (noting that the procedural and
substantive rules governing the Guantánamo Bay military commissions lack
the power to proceed ―because of its failures to comply with the terms of the
UCMJ and the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949‖).
284. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (holding that federal law denying
Guantánamo Bay detainees the access to federal courts violates the
Suspension Clause in Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution and that
the substitute provided by the federal law is constitutionally inadequate).
285. But see Steven Calabresi & Kevin Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153
(1992); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative
State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963 (2001); Christopher
Yoo, Steven Calabresi & Anthony Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the
Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2005). This philosophy was
summed up by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 679 (2006).
Congress, to be sure, has a substantial and essential role in
both foreign affairs and national security. But Congress
cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible
action the President may find it necessary to take or every
possible situation in which he might act, and [s]uch failure
of Congress . . . does not, especially in the areas of foreign
policy and national security, imply congressional
disapproval of action taken by the Executive.
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 679 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
But see Peter Irons, “The Constitution is Just a Scrap of Paper”: Empire
versus Democracy, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1081, 1091 (2005); Gary Lawson &
Christopher Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81
IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1270 (1996).
286. Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo, Deputy
Assistant Attorneys Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, to
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How do we evaluate if a torture warrant comports with due
process or the Eighth Amendment?
An after-the-fact
constitutional evaluation of a specific torture warrant involves
all of the principles recognized in the Supreme Court‘s qualified
immunity jurisprudence.
But the application of those
principles must be significantly tweaked and recalibrated.
Artificially erecting insurmountable pleading hurdles based on
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is unlikely to be
a workable or honest solution to this complex problem. Nor can
we structure the officials‘ ―individual responsibility‖ in such a
way as to let all high-level officials off the hook. Most
frequently, the subordinates are the ones who are executing
the commands given from the upper echelons. Third, and on a
related point, we must not so unnaturally restrict the definition
of ―official duties‖ (under Robertson v. Sichel)287 to the
individual tasks of the officials (high or petty). The supervisory
duties of high-level administrators are just as ―official‖ as other
tasks composing their portfolios.
Inviting the ―conscious disregard of the complex role of
facts in constitutional adjudication,‖ the Supreme Court‘s
―clearly established law‖ test in its qualified immunity cases
poses pragmatic and logistical problems as well. Professor
Alan Chen argues the ―multifactored balancing tests in
substantive constitutional law‖ are difficult enough to apply in
the immediate case, let alone to argue that they serve in a
multitude of cases as a benchmark reminder of what sort of
conduct is constitutionally permissible.288 Still, a principledline must be drawn between judicial restraint and
abandonment in order to continue enforcing liability (direct or
some form of vicarious) in cases where government actors
violate constitutional rights.
Obviously, as supervisory liability becomes more vicarious,
the qualified immunity defense grows stronger and a plaintiff‘s
chance of recovering money damages becomes weaker. In his
Iqbal dissent, Justice Breyer mentioned that ―a trial court,
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep‘t. of Def. on Possible Habeas
Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Dec. 28, 2001),
available at http://texscience.org/reform/torture/philbin-yoo-habeas-28dec
01.pdf.
287. 127 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1888).
288. Chen, supra note 254, at 230.
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responsible for managing a case and ‗mindful of the need to
vindicate the purpose of the qualified immunity defense,‘ can
structure discovery in ways that diminish the risk of imposing
unwarranted burdens upon public officials.‖289 The court may
―begin discovery with lower level government defendants before
determining whether a case can be made to allow discovery
related to higher level government officials.‖290 This approach
would weed out meritless cases against higher-level officials,
and is in line with the fact that ―[t]he law, after all, provides
trial courts with other legal weapons designed to prevent
unwarranted interference.‖291 The Iqbal Court expressly noted
a desire to disincentivize the discovery stages for high officials
with demanding functions. Justice Souter‘s dissent similarly
explained that the Court‘s failure to see the various degrees
and shades of supervisory liability in Bivens actions led to the
mistaken binary belief that there could either be complete
supervisory liability or none whatsoever.292 The Court chose
the latter path.
Furthermore, the torture warrant procedure must take
care to honor the ―deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone
should have his own day in court.‖293 This means more than
just that persons should not be barred from challenging their
torture by suspended habeas or lack of federal jurisdiction in
those cases.
Federal jurisdiction is not conferred by
congressional enactments such as the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005 (DTA)294 or the Military Commissions Act (MCA);295
289. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1961 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
290. Id. at 1961-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
291. Id. at 1961 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 1958 (Souter, J., dissenting) (―Even if an employer is not
liable for the actions of his employee solely because the employee was acting
within the scope of employment, there still might be conditions to render a
supervisor liable for the conduct of his subordinate.‖).
293. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171 (2008) (quoting Richards v.
Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)) (acknowledging that the federal
common law of preclusion is governed by constitutional due process
restrictions).
294. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat.
2680 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2000), 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006), and 42
U.S.C. § 2000(d)). Section 1005(e) of the DTA amended the erstwhile federal
habeas corpus statute (28 U.S.C. § 2241) to provide that ―no court, justice, or
judge shall have jurisdiction to . . . consider . . . an application for . . . habeas
corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained . . . at Guantánamo.‖ The
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these statutes had a preclusive effect on federal court
jurisdiction over habeas claims from Guantánamo.
The
Government must take special care to ensure that legal
services, including attorneys and expedited procedures, are
extended to those challenging their torture. Observance of
these strictures is essential, but not necessarily sufficient, to
satisfy the substance of the strict scrutiny test. The two
benchmarks of that test, a compelling societal interest and
narrow tailoring, are situation-specific and may authorize
torture only in limited circumstances.
Despite the ―absolute ban‖ on torture currently in place,
that patchwork jurisprudence is fraught with governmentapproved exceptions (many of which are clandestine).296 Such a
façade of a rhetorical absolute ban clearly contravenes the rule
of law because it obfuscates the truth and provides
misinformation to the electorate.
It also ―encourages
inappropriate torture by preventing proper assessment of the
appropriateness of torture‘s quantity and quality.‖297
Moreover, this regime makes no room for regulated torture
that could be authorized by a United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) tribunal,298 which would
amended version has been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
295. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948-50 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006); and 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)-(e) (2006)).
296. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 22, at 1484. See also Raviv, supra note
32, at 149 (―A number of the countries that have signed on to these
conventions, including Great Britain and Israel, have quite plainly engaged
in activities that violate the conventions, indicating that at least some
officials in these countries think that torture can be an effective means of
extracting desired information.‖ (footnotes omitted)).
297. Goldberg, supra note 37, at 4.
298. The FISC is a United States federal court (but not an Article III
court) authorized by 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (or the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978).
This court oversees requests for
surveillance warrants from Federal Government police agencies, such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, against suspected foreign intelligence
agents. Recently the FISC has been embroiled in several privacy-related
controversies related to (1) allegations that its warrants exceeded the
commission Congress gave the court, or (2) that government officials
circumvented the court altogether. See Carol D. Leonnig & Dafna Linzer,
Spy Court Judge Quits in Protest: Jurist Concerned Bush Order Tainted Work
of Secret Panel, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A01; Dan Eggen & Susan
Schmidt, Secret Court Rebuffs Ashcroft. Justice Dept. Chided On
Misinformation, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2002, at A01.
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have an immediate, time-sensitive perspective and sufficient
judicial independence to refuse a government request. The
arguments supporting transparency would most likely not be
undermined if Congress were to exclude ordinary Article III
federal district courts from acting as Torture Warrant
Tribunals. But, certainly, an adequate substitute and a strong
appellate process are necessary—one candidate has been the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (the
traditional forum for administrative and constitutional law).
As a result of the Supreme Court‘s qualified immunity
jurisprudence, the threshold for relief in cases against
government officials who committed torture in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001 has been significantly raised. Indeed, it
has been raised so high that it is now extremely difficult for a
torturee to obtain pecuniary relief.299 Part of the reason for
this trend is that courts are unwilling to second-guess Congress
or the President on national security issues due to the
institutional competence of the latter branches; another part of
the reason is that courts believe that the responsibility to
conduct national security affairs sweeps so broadly as to eclipse
individual rights in many situations;300 and certainly part of
the reason is that qualified immunity must be so controlled
that only the most heinous conduct is punished. That said,
what the Court might understand or apply as a ―heinous‖
standard is also not quite clear. Does it mean something along
the lines of genocide or crimes against humanity? Or can it be
closer to a search-and-frisk Fourth Amendment violation?
Where does torture fall between these two extremes?
These musings are not impractical or unlikely to arise.
Bivens-like cases do not allow courts to make those
determinations of their own initiative; rather the limited role of
the judiciary is to determine whether there was a
constitutional violation forbidden by Bivens and whether,
under Rule 8, the plaintiffs have provided enough evidence to
299. Of course, by way of distinguishing future cases, one might argue
that the tragedy of September 11 justified measures that will not be justified
by future instances of torture.
300. See, e.g., Philip B. Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in
the Aftermath of September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 441 (2002); Neal K.
Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the
Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); Jules Lobel, The War On
Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 767 (2002).
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state a prima facie case. Preferring one set of violations over
another would be judicial law-making in the quintessential
sense. And while it is true that ―[w]hen the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,
his authority is at its maximum,‖ it does not mean that the
exercise of power is automatically constitutional.301 The degree
of this ―implied authorization‖ weighs heavily. For instance, if
Congress passed legislation in the year 2015 providing that
―The President shall have the power to take care that the
Army‘s practices and drills are helpful and successful,‖ it would
not override a 2005 law that specifically described the
protections that a certain species of animals enjoyed—even if
the Army, at the President‘s direction, found it easier to
practice in a manner that harmed that protected species. The
degree and specificity of the regulations as well as the possible,
less drastic alternatives figure into the analysis. Only if an
effort to reconcile the two statutes fails do we entertain the
possibility that one might supersede the other. And we should
not cavalierly assume that Congress is always constitutionally
capable of transferring its prerogative to the President.
In all of those cases, the Court must be sufficiently sincere
and candid, spelling out what the standard is and avoiding
running away with the goal-post as soon as the plaintiffs reach
the goal. In most cases, injunctive relief is out of the question
(after the torture has already been committed). And most
officials do not face disciplinary or other legal consequences for
their actions. There is cause to believe, according to the United
Nations Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights, Sir Nigel Rodley, that ―impunity continues to be the
principal cause of the perpetuation of human rights violations,
and particularly of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary

301. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring). See id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (―When
the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or
in which its distribution is uncertain. . . . When the President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his
power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only
by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.‖).
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executions.‖302 These reasons (in tandem with the fact that
torture may never be fully eliminated) require that the torture
dilemma be brought out into the open. Such transparency and
discussion might help prevent procedural defaults from
impeding substantive justice.303 Foucault, earlier referenced in
Part I, would have said the same: there might be real benefits
in exposing the torture equation (the risks, the probabilities,
and the frequencies of occurrence), without specific details and
identities. Let not good become the enemy of perfect.
IV. Conclusion
We return to Square One: the morality, the effectiveness,
and the dangers of torture. By and large, utilitarian thinking
pervades governments‘ approach to torture. It is true that
rule-absolutists, whether theoretically or empirically, maintain
that torture constitutes an invasion of the physical and mental
sanctity of the human person and must remain categorically
precluded—whatever
the
consequences.
Ruleconsequentialists, on the other hand, believe in the same
bottom-line result but they reason differently. An absolute ban
on torture, in many cases, leads to a better result than does
tinkering with it and poking holes. Unreliability and the
possibility of mistakes also inform this calculus; an absolute
ban on torture is, for pragmatic reasons, superior. An obvious
criticism leveled at the absolute ban against torture is that in
attempting to prevent the pain or even death of one individual,
authorities might give way to the pain of many more innocents.
Of course, there is a difference between government action and
private action. Justice Stevens characterized this sort of
argument as ―a classic non sequitur.‖304
At the very least, however, this means there are some
restraints on what the government can do—mainly with
302. U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM‘R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT SHEET
NO.11 (REV.1), EXTRAJUDICIAL, SUMMARY OR ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS, available
at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet11Rev.1en.pdf.
303. See, e.g., Johnson v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 344 U.S.
48, 62 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (―Procedure is the means; full,
equal and exact enforcement of substantive law is the end.‖ (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
304. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 859 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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reference to conditions, duration, and degree. It establishes a
compelling government interest and does not mean the
government is entirely powerless to act. The counterpoint is
that utilitarianism lacks safeguards, and torture is one such
absolute limitation that forbids society‘s and the legal system‘s
descent into madness. Similar to a proportionality analysis
which balances the need to punish with the risk or culpability
at stake, a theoretical slide down from an aboslute ban on
torture will also open us up to a cost-benefit analysis. The
hazard of such an analysis is that it is subjective and
discretionary (thus capable of arbitrariness) and susceptible of
leading to too much torture. Additionally, a higher moral
standard, it has been argued, enables the United States to
remain a standard bearer of human dignity in the world. An
absolute, immutable commitment against torture is
indispensable to maintaining that high ground.
These
questions are difficult, and even an absolute result should not
come without sufficient deliberation.
In continuing that
thinking, we must remember that
―[s]ecurity considerations‖ are not magic words.
The court must insist on learning the specific
security considerations that prompted the
government‘s actions. The court must also be
persuaded that these considerations actually
motivated the government‘s actions and were not
merely pretextual. Finally, the court must be
convinced that the security measures adopted
were the available measures least damaging to
human rights.305
The intersection and overlapping of due process and the
Eighth Amendment reveal some of the moral concerns as well,
but the decision is also at the Nation‘s public-policy doorstep.
A decision by the People to ban or limit torture (as punishment
and as interrogation)—and to mean it—may end the
constitutional debate.
Until then, the discourse should
continue robustly. The destiny of constitutional republics is
such that it gives them a mandate to ensure security but also
305. Barak, supra note 161, at 157-58.
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the requirement that individual liberties should not be
compromised.
The imposition of torture raises solemn
questions about the violation of another‘s person and the
integrity of their being, even in time-sensitive situations with
innocent lives at stake. However we come out on the ultimate
constitutional question, and our decision will most likely be
case-specific, the moral and philosophical questions will keep
gnawing at the heart of society‘s self-definition. Sophisticated
mechanisms such as torture warrants may well detour the core
debate, but, sooner or later, the main question will arrive at
the judicial gate.
Courts should answer the questions
incrementally, not only with respect for judicial humility but
also due to the fact that a sweeping answer too quickly given
might prove deleterious to future cases.306
Moreover, societies need time and space to reason
themselves through changed circumstances and contexts. The
torture issue needs such space and public input so that the
judicial decision is informed by, rather than preemptive of,
society‘s contemporary understanding.307
A constitutional
306. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (―[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order
to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the
Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court
for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal
procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies
about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring
forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. . . . A military commander may
overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we
review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the
Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own . . . .‖); Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000) (―No court laying down a general rule
can possibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to
apply it, and the sort of modifications represented by these cases are as much
a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision.‖).
307. See Dist. Attorney‘s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne,
129 S. Ct. 2308, 2341 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (―Changes in societal
understanding of the fundamental reasonableness of government actions
work out in much the same way that individuals reconsider issues of
fundamental belief. We can change our own inherited views just so fast, and
a person is not labeled a stick-in-the-mud for refusing to endorse a new moral
claim without having some time to work through it intellectually and
emotionally. Just as attachment to the familiar and the limits of experience
affect the capacity of an individual to see the potential legitimacy of a moral
position, the broader society needs the chance to take part in the dialectic of
public and political back and forth about a new liberty claim before it makes
sense to declare unsympathetic state or national laws arbitrary to the point
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court in a democracy, certainly one of last resort, appreciates as
much.

of being unconstitutional.‖).
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